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RETHINKING THE BAN ON EMPLOYER-LABOR
ORGANIZATION COOPERATION
Heather M. Whitney †

As a result of a variety of changed conditions, traditional union density is at an
all-time low. But while only 6.6% of private sector workers are unionized, the rest of
the workforce has not been without collective voice; nontraditional forms of worker
organizations continue to emerge. Fast Food Forward, the Coalition of Immokalee
Workers’ Fair Food Program, Google’s LGBT Employee Resource Group, and nascent
organizing of “on-demand economy” Uber and Lyft drivers are a few examples of
nontraditional worker organizations providing gains for workers.
The success of many of these organizations has depended on avoiding the
National Labor Relations Act and the restrictions it places on “labor organizations.”
Recognizing this, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the Center for Union Facts
have pushed the National Labor Relations Board to classify these organizations as
“labor organizations.” While labor scholars have begun to realize some of the costs
such classification would impose, one important cost has been neglected: it would
effectively prohibit some of these organizations from cooperating with and taking
financial support from employers. Scholars have failed to grapple with this
consequence because they have yet to recognize that some of these organizations—
organizations heralded as the next wave of workers’ collective voice—are succeeding
as a result of their ability to leverage consumer demand for “ethical” companies in
order to get reputation-sensitive employers to sign agreements and create co-run
organizations that improve conditions for these companies’ and their suppliers’
workers. If these collaborations were prohibited, workers would be constrained in
their ability to improve their conditions in a dominantly post-union world.
† Bigelow Teaching Fellow and Lecturer in Law, University of Chicago Law School. Faculty
Affiliate, Berkman Center for Internet & Society. The author wishes to thank Will Baude, Omri
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Christopher Franco, Jack Goldsmith, Todd Henderson, Aziz Huq, John Inazu, Genevieve
Lakier, Saul Levmore, Richard McAdams, Nadia Nasser-Ghodsi, Martha Nussbaum, Michael
Oswalt, Eric Posner, John Rappaport, Benjamin Sachs, Rachel Sachs, Geoffrey Stone, Laura
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This Article explores, for the first time in the literature, the various
collaborations that have developed between new forms of worker organizations and
employers. It then explains why these organizations are vulnerable to “labor
organization” classification and the bans on company support found in section
8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act and section 302 of the Labor
Management Relations Act. The Article ends by suggesting that the Roberts Court’s
deregulatory First Amendment opens up a possible tool for dramatically curtailing
these bans on free speech grounds. Other labor scholars’ work on the First
Amendment right of assembly provides another.
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INTRODUCTION
Traditional unions—the ones that bargain with employers under
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 1 regime—are in decline. In
1959, 32.3% of the private sector labor force was unionized. 2 In 2005,
only 7.8% of workers in the private sector were. 3 By 2011, that number
was down to 6.9%, 4 and in 2014 that number dropped again, to 6.6%. 5
Earlier scholarship attempted to diagnose the causes of union decline,
pointing to hostile and outdated labor laws, globalization, deregulation,
and digitization as partial culprits. 6 Whatever the causes, many thought
the effect was clear: the death of organized labor. 7
Eventually, however, others began to point out that while
traditional unions and traditional channels for collective action were
blocked, new channels were opening. Workers were continuing to
organize, but in different and more heterogeneous ways. Scholarship
began to examine these alternative methods, discussing, for example, the
use of employment law, 8 the development of worker centers, 9 a new

1 National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012)).
2 See LEO TROY & NEIL SHEFLIN, U.S. UNION SOURCEBOOK: MEMBERSHIP, FINANCES,
STRUCTURE, DIRECTORY app. A at A-1 (1st ed. 1985).
3 News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members in 2005 (Jan. 20, 2006), http://
www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/union2_01202006.pdf.
4 Union Membership, 2011, ECON. DAILY (Jan. 30, 2012), http://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/
2012/ted_20120130.htm.
5 Union Membership (Annual) News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union
Members—2014
(Jan.
23,
2015),
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/union2_
01232015.htm.
6 See, e.g., PAUL OSTERMAN, SECURING PROSPERITY: THE AMERICAN LABOR MARKET: HOW
IT HAS CHANGED AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (1999); KATHERINE V. W. STONE, FROM
WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT REGULATION FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE (2004);
Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527 (2002)
[hereinafter Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law]; Paul C. Weiler, Promises to
Keep: Securing Workers’ Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769,
1795 (1983).
7 See, e.g., Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, supra note 6 at 1527 (“Evidence of morbidity abounds.”).
8 See Benjamin I. Sachs, Employment Law as Labor Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2685 (2008)
[hereinafter Sachs, Employment Law as Labor Law]. But for limits on this tactic see Catherine
L. Fisk, Union Lawyers and Employment Law, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 57 (2002)
(discussing the ways labor law restricts union use of employment law litigation to advance
worker interests); Katherine V. W. Stone, Procedure, Substance, and Power: Collective Litigation
and Arbitration Under the Labor Law, 61 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 164 (2013) (discussing
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“tetralogy” of representation for low-wage service workers, 10 and private
ordering between employers and unions outside of the NLRA regime. 11
Scholars recognized that a “new wave” of worker organization was
arriving and it resisted generalization. 12
Riding this new wave, labor scholars continued to not just rethink
labor law, but also reimagined what the future of labor itself might look
like in a world of dramatically changed work, economic, and doctrinal
conditions. Professor Benjamin Sachs suggested unbundling unions
from economic bargaining, allowing them to act as purely political
organizations. 13 Professor Cynthia Estlund put forward a way to use the
rise of company self-regulation to push for the fortification of employee
rights and improved labor standards. 14 Professor Katherine Stone has
looked internationally and described alternative forms of worker
organizations in places like Australia, the European Union, and Japan.15
And yet, for all this rethinking and reimagining, it appears few have
been willing to rethink the ban on company support of, and
membership in, “labor organizations” found in section 8(a)(2) of the
National Labor Relations Act, 16 and the prohibition on employers giving

employers conditioning employment on workers signing arbitration agreements, thereby
curtailing group employment litigation as a means of achieving workplace change).
9 See JANICE FINE, WORKER CENTERS: ORGANIZING COMMUNITIES AT THE EDGE OF THE
DREAM (2006).
10 See Alan Hyde, Who Speaks for the Working Poor?: A Preliminary Look at the Emerging
Tetralogy of Representation of Low-Wage Service Workers, 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599
(2004) (explaining that the “tetraology” is one where unions either compete or cooperate with
legal advocacy groups, public officials, and ethnic or immigrant groups to advocate for lowwage service workers).
11 See James J. Brudney, Neutrality Agreements and Card Check Recognition: Prospects for
Changing Paradigms, 90 IOWA L. REV. 819 (2005).
12 See Jim Pope, Next Wave Organizing and the Shift to a New Paradigm of Labor Law, 50
N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 515, 534–35 (2005) (“[A] variety of forms could prevail in different
economic sectors and geographic regions. ‘History shows,’ . . . ‘that the labor movement thrived
when it tolerated and even nourished multiple, and at times competing, models of unionism.’”
(quoting Dorothy Sue Cobble, Lost Ways of Unionism: Historical Perspectives on Reinventing
the Labor Movement, in REKINDLING THE MOVEMENT: LABOR’S QUEST FOR RELEVANCE IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 82–83 (Lowell Turner et al. eds., 2001))).
13 Benjamin I. Sachs, Essay, The Unbundled Union: Politics Without Collective Bargaining,
123 YALE L.J. 148 (2013) [hereinafter Sachs, The Unbundled Union].
14 Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 319 (2005) [hereinafter Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace].
15 Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Green Shoots in the Labor Market: A Cornucopia of Social
Experiments, 36 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 293 (2015).
16 National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, sec. 8(a)(2), 49 Stat. 449, 452 (1935) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2)) (making it “an unfair labor practice for an employer . . . to
dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or
contribute financial or other support to it”).
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money and other things of value to a “labor organization” found in
section 302 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA). 17
Scholars have largely failed to grapple with the effects of section
8(a)(2) of the NLRA and section 302 of the LMRA because they have yet
to recognize that some of these worker organizations—organizations
heralded as the next wave of worker collective voice—are succeeding as
a result of their ability to leverage consumer demand for “ethical”
companies. For example, workers will get their reputation-sensitive
employers to sign agreements and create co-run organizations designed
to improve conditions for these companies’ and their suppliers’
workers. 18 In other words, scholars have yet to recognize that many of
these new organizations are creating agreements and accepting financial
contributions from employers that would often be prohibited if the
organizations were “labor organizations.” 19 The shadow of sections
8(a)(2) and 302 is not illusory: organizations like the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce and the Center for Union Facts continue to push the
National Labor Relations Board (Board) to classify these new
organizations as “labor organizations” for purposes of the NLRA. 20
Thus, it is important to understand both the ways in which these
organizations have already begun working with employers and how
labor law may come to bear on them; that is the aim of this Article.
Before going further, a clarification: It is not the case that labor
scholars have never called for rethinking the ban on company support of
labor organizations. In the 1990s, such a rethinking was called for, but
in order to make room for a particular type of company-worker
collaboration that was on a far smaller scale, and with far different
purposes, than the sorts of collaborations at stake today. 21

17

Section 302 of the LMRA, a criminal statute, makes it unlawful for

any employer to pay, lend, or deliver, or agree to pay, lend, or deliver, any money or
other thing of value . . . to any labor organization . . . which represents, seeks to
represent, or would admit to membership, any of the employees of such employer
who are employed in an industry affecting commerce.
Labor Management Relations Act, ch. 20, sec. 302, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. § 186(a)(2) (2012)). Estlund, for one, has considered the section 8(a)(2) problem that
worker centers face, although she argues that such organizations should not be deemed “labor
organizations” at all. See CYNTHIA ESTLUND, REGOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: FROM SELFREGULATION TO CO-REGULATION 181–85 (2010).
18 See Section I.C.
19 See Section III.A.
20 See U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, THE NEW MODEL OF REPRESENTATION: AN
OVERVIEW OF LEADING WORKER CENTERS (2014) [hereinafter AN OVERVIEW OF LEADING
WORKER CENTERS].
21 See, e.g., Mark Barenberg, Democracy and Domination in the Law of Workplace
Cooperation: From Bureaucratic to Flexible Production, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 753, 879–928 (1994).
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While “vigorous enforcement of [s]ection 8(a)(2) [of the NLRA]
erased company unionism . . . as a central issue in labor law,” the
question of company support reemerged starting in the late 1960s. 22
Scholars posit at least two reasons: labor unrest starting in the early
1970s and the continuing transition to a more competitive global
economy, and with it, the pressure for increased productivity and
creativity. In particular, Japan began to be seen as a major competitor,
and academics hypothesized that their ability to create high-quality
products at lower costs was the result of their superior forms of
management, which included quality circles and team-based work
systems. 23 Hoping that imitating Japanese management style would
increase U.S. competitiveness, companies began experimenting with
these different organizational structures, all of which fell under the
general category of Quality of Work Life (QWL) or “participative
management” programs. 24 The issue of company support of labor
organizations then arose because some of the QWL programs, like
quality circles, arguably constituted “labor organizations” that
employers were unlawfully “interfering” with or “supporting,” in
violation of section 8(a)(2). 25
That quality circles were “labor organizations” and that company
support of them was unlawful was not a foregone conclusion in either

Id. at 879.
See George Munchus, III, Employer-Employee Based Quality Circles in Japan: Human
Resource Policy Implications for American Firms, 8 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 255 (1983); see also
Barenberg, supra note 21, at 887–88.
22
23

A quality circle is a group of employees that meets regularly to solve problems
affecting its work area. Generally, 6 to 12 volunteers from the same work area make
up the circle. The members receive training in problem solving, statistical quality
control, and group process. Quality circles generally recommend solutions for quality
and productivity problems which management then may implement. A facilitator,
usually a specially trained member of management, helps train circle members and
ensures that things run smoothly. Typical objectives of QC programs include quality
improvement, productivity enhancement, and employee involvement. Circles
generally meet four hours a month on company time. Members may get recognition
but rarely receive financial rewards.
Edward E. Lawler III & Susan A. Mohrman, Quality Circles After the Fad, HARV. BUS. REV.,
Jan. 1985.
24 See Takao Kato & Motohiro Morishima, The Productivity Effects of Participatory
Employment Practices: Evidence from New Japanese Panel Data, 41 INDUS. REL. 487, 516–17
(2002); David Lewin, The Future of Employee Involvement/Participation in the United States, 40
LAB. L.J. 470, 470 (1989); Munchus, supra note 23.
25 See Lewin, supra note 24. “Labor organization” is defined broadly as “any organization of
any kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which employees
participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers
concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions
of work.” 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (2012).
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law or legal scholarship. 26 Far from it: quality circles were quite popular
starting in the late 1970s and early 1980s. In 1982, forty-four percent of
all companies with more than 500 employees had quality circle
programs, with some estimating that 75% of those started after 1980. 27
Over ninety of the Fortune 500 companies likely had quality circle
programs, including IBM, Honeywell, Westinghouse, and Xerox. 28
Courts, too, were frequently looking for a way to make room for the
types of worker organizations companies were insisting were necessary
to stay competitive while also enforcing section 8(a)(2). To that end, the
courts began to develop two paths around section 8(a)(2) violations:
First, and more frequently, courts held that while quality circles and
entities like them were labor organizations, section 8(a)(2) was only
violated where there was actual “domination” and not just “support,”
despite the plain language of the NLRA. 29 Other courts and the Board
tried to make room for QWL organizations by avoiding section 8(a)(2)
in the first instance by narrowing the definition of “labor
organization.” 30 This relaxing of section 8(a)(2), and with it the trend of
incorporating modified versions of Japanese organizational structures,
came to a halt with the Board’s early 1990s decisions in Electromation 31
and, six months later, in E. I. du Pont de Nemours. 32 These two seminal
26 See, e.g., Thomas C. Kohler, Models of Worker Participation: The Uncertain Significance
of Section 8(a)(2), 27 B.C. L. REV. 499 (1986) (arguing section 8(a)(2) should prohibit some of
these new employee-participation groups); John R. McLain, Note, Participatory Management
Under Sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1736
(1985) (arguing that participatory management programs initiated by employers in nonunion
settings should be permissible); Joseph B. Ryan, Comment, The Encouragement of LaborManagement Cooperation: Improving American Productivity Through Revision of the National
Labor Relations Act, 40 UCLA L. REV. 571, 634 (1992) (arguing for the adoption of an “actual”
rather than “potential” domination standard).
27 See Lawler & Mohrman, supra note 23.
28 Id.; see also Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990, 1005 (1992) (Raudabaugh, concurring)
(“Employee participation in decision-making in the workplace and cooperative efforts between
employers and employees began to emerge as significant phenomena in the late 1970s.”), aff’d
sub nom. Electromation, Inc. v. NLRB, 35 F.3d 1148 (7th Cir. 1994).
29 See, e.g., Classic Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 667 F.2d 205, 209 (1st Cir. 1981); NLRB v. Ne.
Univ., 601 F.2d 1208, 1214 (1st Cir. 1979) (“[I]f anything, changing conditions in the labormanagement field seem to have strengthened the case for providing room for cooperative
employer-employee arrangements as alternatives to the traditional adversary model.”); Hertzka
& Knowles v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 1974); Modern Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 379
F.2d 201, 204 (6th Cir. 1967); Chi. Rawhide Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 221 F.2d 165, 167 (7th Cir.
1955). But see NLRB v. Keller Ladders S., Inc., 405 F.2d 663, 667 (5th Cir. 1968) (finding
employer interfered with the formation of a labor organization by contributing support to a
competing outside union).
30 See, e.g., Sparks Nugget, Inc., 230 N.L.R.B. 275 (1977) (holding that a grievance
committee is not a labor organization because it performed only adjudicative functions), rev’d
on other grounds, 623 F.2d 571 (9th Cir. 1980).
31 Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990.
32 E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893 (1993).
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cases made clear that QWL organizations were often “labor
organizations” and actual domination was not necessary for the
employer to have violated section 8(a)(2)—mere interference or
financial support was enough.
In the wake of Electromation, the Board saw very few section
8(a)(2) cases 33 and industry argued that the decision “and its
progeny . . . had a chilling effect on employers’ willingness to initiate
and/or continue employee participation committees, at the very time
these committees have become widely recognized as a major means of
improving productivity and enhancing product quality.” 34 In response,
companies pushed Congress to override Electromation through passage
of the Teamwork for Employees and Managers (TEAM) Act, which
“would have amended section 8(a)(2) to allow employers to establish
employee participation programs ‘to address matters of mutual interest
(including issues of quality, productivity, efficiency) and which does not
have, claim, or seek authority to negotiate or enter into collective
bargaining agreements [under this Act] with the employer.’” 35 While the
TEAM Act eventually passed both houses of Congress, its supporters
were unable to override President Bill Clinton’s veto. 36
It was during the time of quality circles and the TEAM Act that
scholars last thought seriously about the ban on company support of
labor organizations. Those who supported a narrowing or repeal of the
ban were looking to make room for intra-company quality circles,
which were thought to increase productivity and U.S. competitiveness. 37
The thought of employers funding or participating in larger
nontraditional worker organizations was not on the table, nor was the
realization that some of these organizations would negotiate with
employers outside the auspices of the NLRA regime. And for good
reason: the next wave of worker organizations had yet to arrive.

33 See The Teamwork for Employees and Managers Act of 1997: Hearing on S. 295 Before the
S. Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 105th Cong. 49 (1997) (statement of Sen. Edward M.
Kennedy) (“Since the National Labor Relations Board decided the Electromation case in 1992,
the Board has resolved only 16 cases—out of 54,919 cases considered—in which part of the
remedy required dissolution of employee teams.”); see also Michael H. LeRoy, “Dealing with”
Employee Involvement in Nonunion Workplaces: Empirical Research Implications for the Team
Act and Electromation, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 31, 42 (1997) (“The NLRB rarely adjudicates
section 8(a)(2) cases.”).
34 The Teamwork for Employees and Managers Act of 1995: Hearing on S. 295 Before the S.
Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 104th Cong. 67 (1995) (statement of Daniel V. Yager,
Assistant General Counsel, Labor Policy Association).
35 Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, supra note 6, at 1541 n.64
(quoting The Teamwork for Employees and Managers Act, S. 295, 104th Cong. § 3 (1995)).
36 Id. at 1541.
37 See id.
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Since the 1990s, new forms of worker organization have indeed
proliferated, and with them, more complex relationships with
employers. Specifically, today we see new forms of worker organizations
forging partnerships with companies as a result of at least two strategies.
First, some target reputation-sensitive employers with campaigns that
expose the conditions those companies’ workers, or those companies’
suppliers’ workers, face. Recognizing that some consumers and
regulators penalize companies that treat workers poorly, these
companies come to various agreements with the worker organizations. 38
The Coalition of Immokalee Workers’ Fair Food Council (the Council)
used this first strategy as a way to get companies like Whole Foods to
“donate” money to the Council and require their suppliers to agree to
Council monitoring. 39
The second method is to work proactively with companies looking
to distinguish themselves as particularly good to workers, through the
creation of organizations like Restaurant Opportunities Centers United,
which in turn promotes consumer awareness of (and spending at) “high
road” restaurants. 40 Both these relationships and the effect labor law has
on their possibility moving forward are topics left largely unaddressed
in the literature; this Article seeks to fill that gap.
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I outlines the changing
conditions that have contributed to the decline of traditional
unionization and the creation of new worker organizations, including
those that benefit from collaborations with companies. In particular,
Part I discusses the leverage that consumer demand for “ethically”
created goods has given new forms of worker organizations in their
interactions with reputation-sensitive companies. While outside the
38 See Steven Greenhouse, Fight for $15: The Strategist Going to War to Make McDonald’s
Pay, GUARDIAN (Aug. 30, 2015, 10:42 AM) [hereinafter Greenhouse, Fight for $15], http://
www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/aug/30/fight-for-15-strategist-mcdonalds-unions
(“Already, as a result of the Fight for $15’s prodding, Brazilian prosecutors are investigating
alleged wage theft, child labor and unsafe conditions at McDonald’s franchised operations,
while the European Union is investigating it for more than $1bn in alleged tax evasion. In New
York, a panel appointed by Governor Andrew Cuomo ruled that the state’s 180,000 fast-food
workers should be paid a minimum of $15 an hour, in response to protests and pressure from
Fight for $15.”). As I explain below, while the SEIU has given money to Fight for $15, it is not
actually a part of the SEIU. See infra Section II.B.1. This is precisely why the Chamber of
Commerce has pushed the Board to recognize Fight for $15 and other organizations like it as
“labor organizations”—because, while they are not officially part of traditional unions, they get
funding from them. See infra text accompanying note 264.
39 See Press Release, Ahold USA, Ahold USA Joins the Coalition of Immokalee Workers’
Fair Food Program, (July 29, 2015) [hereinafter Ahold USA Press Release], http://
www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/ahold-usa-joins-the-coalition-of-immokalee-workers-fairfood-program-300120235.html.
40 See Our Work, RESTAURANT OPPORTUNITIES CENTERS UNITED, http://rocunited.org/ourwork (last visited Jan. 5, 2016).
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NLRA regime, the ability to expose companies to reputational harm for
failing to live up to their “do good” marketing has paved the way for a
variety of worker-company partnerships that have helped workers but
would likely violate the NLRA if they occurred under that regime. 41
Part II presents accounts of a variety of nontraditional worker
organizations and describes how they have partnered or could partner
with companies as a means to achieving their ends. Part III explains the
problem: the broad definition of covered “labor organizations,” and the
broad interpretation of what counts as unlawful “support” and
“interference” under section 8(a)(2), and what counts as a “thing of
value” under section 302.
Part IV briefly discusses various potential solutions to the ban on
company support and highlights that the speech and association-based
constitutional challenges labor scholars have begun to develop in other
areas of labor law, aided by the Roberts Court’s increasingly deregulated
First Amendment, may be of use. 42 While this Court’s First Amendment
is commonly understood to help corporations over workers, it may also
be a tool with which to challenge and creatively destroy bans on
company support that are, today, not only impediments to the
development of new forms of worker organizations but are also good for
companies that promote themselves as doing well by their workers, reap
benefits in the market by selling that goodness, and yet systematically
fail to make good on those promises.
I. CHANGING CONDITIONS
Developments in three areas have contributed to the creation of
new forms of worker organizations that have used support from
companies to help further their ends. The first involves changes to the
nature of work and company-worker relations. The second is the state
of the NLRA and LMRA regimes and more recent doctrinal shifts by the
Supreme Court. And the third—a consumer market for “ethically
created” products and services—is a market that worker organizations
have begun to leverage as a means to get reputation-sensitive companies
to support developing forms of nontraditional worker organizations. I
discuss each in turn.

41 I put both “ethically” and “do good” in quotations merely to register that what counts as
“ethically” created is no doubt contestable. I discuss the legal risks these organizations face in
Part III.
42 See, e.g., Marion Crain & John Inazu, Re-Assembling Labor, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1791
(2015).

WHITNEY.37.4.7 (Do Not Delete)

4/3/2016 1:53 PM

2016] EMPLOYER-LABOR ORGANIZATION COOPERATION
A.

1465

Company-Worker Relations

Whether one supports unionization or not, the NLRA was
originally intended to protect “full freedom of association [and] selforganization” for workers. 43 As Benjamin Sachs, Professor of Labor and
Industry at Harvard Law School, has pointed out, most scholars believe
it has failed to do this for one of two reasons: the statute is too weak, and
thus unable to do the necessary protecting, or the statute is too rigid,
unable to keep pace with changes in the composition and nature of
work. 44 An examination of modern company-worker relations speaks to
the latter reason.
NLRA-style unionization is premised on the notion of a single
company that acts as a stable employer of long-term, full-time
employees. 45 But a number of transformations to the nature of work
have rendered anachronistic this conception, and with it the possibility
of 1935-era unionization, increasingly impracticable.
Perhaps most significantly, the modern workplace is fissured. 46
“Employment is no longer the clear relationship between a well-defined
employer and a worker. The basic terms of employment—hiring,
evaluation, pay, supervision, training, and coordination—are now the
result of multiple organizations.” 47
Supply chains and outsourcing more generally provide one
example of this. A basic question a company must answer is whether a
particular activity it needs done (be it manufacturing, marketing, or
inventing) occurs within the corporation itself. 48 This choice may be
43 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012); accord Marion Crain & Ken Matheny, Beyond Unions,
Notwithstanding Labor Law, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 561, 574 (2014) (“The protection afforded
by the Wagner Act for concerted activity broke new ground in the embrace of group action by
workers in the private sector.”).
44 See Sachs, Employment Law as Labor Law, supra note 8.
45 See STONE, supra note 6, at 3; Stone, supra note 15, at 298 (“[T]he New Deal labor law—
the National Labor Relations Act—organized collective bargaining rights according to stable
bargaining units within firms. The law assumed employees had long-term employment
relationships and facilitated unionization for employees in large firms that offered long-term
employment.”).
46 See DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE: WHY WORK BECAME SO BAD FOR SO
MANY AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT (2014).
47 Id. at 7. Whereas forty-three percent of companies used temporary workers in the early
2000s, with temporary workers making up approximately 8.7% of their workforce, in 2013
approximately ten percent of the entire American workforce was employed through a
temporary staffing agency. See Peter H. Cappelli & J.R. Keller, A Study of the Extent and
Potential Causes of Alternative Employment Arrangements, 66 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 874, 884
(2013); Ronald A. Wirtz, Temporary Employment Sector: Matchmaker, Matchmaker,
FEDGAZETTE (Jan. 23, 2014), https://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications/fedgazette/
temporary-employment-sector-matchmaker-matchmaker.
48 See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
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influenced by a variety of considerations, but for corporations with the
exclusive goal of maximizing shareholder value, the answer will be
straightforward: which is cheaper? In the past, the direct costs of
producing a cell phone in China or a lower-cost area in the United
States might be far lower than those associated with producing it in
house at the company’s headquarters in Silicon Valley; other transaction
costs, like those associated with transportation and monitoring, were
sufficiently high that cheaper labor did not always translate to cheaper
production, all things considered. 49 Today, however, those transaction
costs are going down. Flying to China to check on manufacturers is
cheap and email and surveillance technologies make monitoring farflung factories cheaper. 50 Additionally, by contracting out a particular
project or job, companies can take advantage of the downward pressure
facing smaller companies that compete to win bids for those jobs. 51 If a
hotel is looking to outsource its room-keeping, it can create a bidding
war between vendors, who in turn cut worker wages or risk losing the
contract.
Supply chains makes traditional unionization ineffective, if possible
at all. With outsourcing, even if the workers are able to successfully
unionize the supplier, the supplier itself is intensely competing for bids
against other, non-unionized competitors, in low-margin markets. 52 The
result will often be that the unionized workforce simply does not win
contracts for work at all. And in cases where suppliers win and workers
subsequently unionize, there is simply not enough money to go around,
and the lead company is always free to choose a cheaper (typically nonunionized) supplier during the next round of bidding. 53 Thus,
unionization of a single low-level supplier is not an effective strategy for
workers looking to better their position.
Franchises are another method of fissuring. 54 As one way to lower
costs while increasing profits, companies focus on creating and
developing a brand while outsourcing day-to-day business operations to
franchisees. 55 Companies like McDonald’s use this strategy; they create
strong brand identities and then sign franchise agreements whereby
franchisees agree to abide by strict quality standards. 56 In exchange, the
See WEIL, supra note 46, at 168.
See id.
51 See id. at 15.
52 See id.
53 See id. at 77.
54 See id. at 122–58.
55 See id.
56 This can include dictating store hours, pricing, and staffing levels. See Who’s the Boss?
The “Joint Employer” Standard and Business Ownership: Hearing Before S. Comm. on Health,
Education, Labor and Pensions, 114th Cong. 1 (Feb. 5, 2015); see also Chris Opfer, Senate Panel
49
50
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franchisee gains access to a consumer-trusted brand while starting their
business.
The franchise arrangement used by companies like McDonald’s
render traditional unionization difficult and ineffective. First, the nature
of franchisee-franchisor relation often puts downward pressure on
wages, which results in low-wage and part-time work, as a means to
avoid triggering additional benefits. 57 This combination, in turn, leads
to high turnover and workers juggling multiple jobs, both of which leave
them with little time and motivation to unionize a bad but ultimately
short-term workplace. 58
Moreover, franchisee workers can typically only unionize on a
franchisee-by-franchisee basis, since the franchisee of each in particular
location traditionally stands as the sole employer of the workers in its
particular establishment. This is a problem for workers who want to use
collective action as a way to negotiate for improved conditions, since the
inaccessible franchisor can maintain significant control over rules about
employee scheduling and human resource activities and yet are not at
the bargaining table. 59 Thus, even if unionization efforts are successful,
the franchisor’s control means franchisees have little room to
meaningfully negotiate on issues like wages and working conditions. 60
While the answer here may be that the franchisors that exert substantial
control over the terms and conditions of work most salient to workers
should be held a joint employer, the litigation required to achieve that
outcome is time-consuming and costly. 61
As a result of globalization and new technological developments,
companies have also moved further away from long-term employment

Eyes Joint Employer Liability, as Opponents Get Ready for NLRB Decision, BNA LABOR REL.
WK. (Feb. 11, 2015).
57 Franchisees pay royalties based on revenue, not profit. As a result, franchisees benefit
from increased profit per sale while franchisors benefit from increased sale volume. As a result,
the franchisor structures franchise agreements to maximize sale volume. See WEIL, supra note
46, at 122–58. Thus, franchisees are in turn incentivized to cut unfixed costs, which often means
labor costs and health and safety. One study found the probability of noncompliance to be
23.6% higher among franchisee-owned restaurants than among similar company-owned ones.
See id. at 131 (citing Min Woong Ji & David Weil, Does Ownership Structure Influence
Regulatory Behavior? The Impact of Franchising on Labor Standards Compliance (2009)).
58 See id.; see also Steven Greenhouse, In Drive to Unionize, Fast-Food Workers Walk Off the
Job, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2012) [hereinafter Greenhouse, Fast-Food Workers Walk Off the Job].
59 See Greenhouse, Fast-Food Workers Walk Off the Job, supra note 58.
60 See WEIL, supra note 46, at 122–58.
61 By way of example, a set of cases claiming McDonald’s (the franchisor) exerts sufficient
control over individual franchisee restaurants such as to be a joint employer and is thus jointly
liable for labor law violations are ongoing though they have been litigated since November 2012.
See McDonald’s USA, LLC, 36 N.L.R.B. 144 (2016).
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promises. 62 In the June 2013 issue of the Harvard Business Review, Reid
Hoffman, co-founder of LinkedIn, and co-authors argued that
globalization and the Information Age had eroded stability, put
adaptability and entrepreneurship front and center, and “demolished
the traditional employer-employee compact and its accompanying
career escalator in the U.S. private sector.” 63 In this world, they
recommended workers think of themselves as “free agents” and the
development of a new employer-employee compact based on “tours of
duty,” where employees are hired for a specified number-of-year
“tours,” typically two to four, with specific and tangible goals. 64 While
commentators often assume this shift to a “gig economy” is a bad thing,
not all workers are opposed. Younger workers especially embrace the
role of freelancer in the knowledge economy. 65 But regardless of one’s
views on long-term versus short-term employment, the less time
workers expect to spend at a particular company, the less likely they will
be willing to organize to improve the terms and conditions of working
there. 66
Not all workers have experienced the full-force of the fissuring and
precarious employment practices described above. Like the welfare
capitalists of the 1920s, some companies have found it in their interest
to invest in sophisticated human resource practices designed to earn
employee trust and loyalty, which in turn contributes to increased
productivity. 67 Some younger workers are especially drawn to this
strategy, as they seek out jobs that give them a sense of meaning, 68 and
62 See Stone, supra note 15, at 298; see also Samuel Estreicher, Labor Law Reform in a World
of Competitive Product Markets, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 5 (1993).
63 See Reid Hoffman, Ben Casnocha & Chris Yeh, Tours of Duty: The New EmployerEmployee Compact, HARV. BUS. REV., June 2013.
64 See id.
65 STONE, supra note 6.
66 See generally ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970) (discussing the
exit versus voice mechanisms).
67 Research shows that when workers feel connected to the larger company “mission,” they
also work harder. See George A. Akerlof, Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange, 97 Q.J.
ECON. 543, 546–50 (1982). “Welfare capitalism” describes the ethos that emerged in the 1920s
that companies could do well by doing good for employees. Profit sharing and stock bonuses,
designed to align employee interests with the company’s success, were first seen at this time.
Cooperative employer-employee relations were also exemplified through the emergence of
group insurance policies, pensions, free clinics, employee cafeterias, and human resource
departments and company unions that ran picnics, glee clubs, dances, and plant-sponsored
recreational events. See MELVYN DUBOFSKY & FOSTER RHEA DULLES, LABOR IN AMERICA: A
HISTORY 230–31 (8th ed. 2010); see also SANFORD M. JACOBY, MODERN MANORS: WELFARE
CAPITALISM SINCE THE NEW DEAL (1998).
68 See, e.g., Rachel Feintzeig, I Don’t Have a Job. I Have a Higher Calling, WALL ST. J. (Feb.
24, 2015, 7:39 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/corporate-mission-statements-talk-of-higherpurpose-1424824784. While we might imagine companies only make do-good commitments to
in-demand workers, that is not the case. As a Kohl’s executive was recently quoted as saying in
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will explicitly forgo increased monetary compensation in order to work
for a company that aligns with their moral convictions. 69 And while the
ability to work for a company that aligns with a worker’s personal
convictions creates an opportunity for low-wage workers as well as high
to find dignity and meaning in the workplace, strong identification with
the employer and its mission makes traditional 1930s unionization less
appealing. 70
B.

The Current NLRA and LMRA Regimes

Federal labor law also makes traditional unionization both difficult
to achieve and less attractive when it is because of both its weak
protection of unionization efforts and recent doctrinal shifts concerning
how unions are paid for their efforts.
Start with obstacles to unionizing. As many scholars have
explained, while the NLRA is meant to protect workers as they exercise
their rights to organize and act collectively for their mutual aid and
protection, the statute fails to adequately disincentivize employers from
infringing on that right. 71 Workers who are wrongly discharged in
retaliation for engaging in protected activity can at most receive back
pay; punitive damages are unavailable. While reinstatement of wrongly
discharged workers is an available remedy, the delays involved in those
proceedings have made them insufficient, costly, and capable of chilling
worker activity. 72 And, given an employer can frequently quash
organizing drives by simply firing (albeit unlawfully) a few union
supporters, it is rational for them to do so. 73 And employers do; one
an investor call, if retail associates “can truly relate their work to some higher purpose,” they
will sell more products. See id.
69 See Michel Anteby, Identity Incentives as an Engaging Form of Control: Revisiting
Leniencies in an Aeronautic Plant, 19 ORG. SCI. 202, 215 (2008) (noting that identity incentives
may lessen the importance of financial compensation); see also Akerlof, supra note 67
(hypothesizing the same).
70 See Marion Crain, Managing Identity: Buying into the Brand at Work, 95 IOWA L. REV.
1179, 1219 (2010) (“[An] association with a powerful or desirable brand thus offers a dignified
and empowering alternative to the reality of most low-waged workers’ lives.”).
71 See James J. Brudney, Reflections on Group Action and the Law of the Workplace, 74 TEX.
L. REV. 1563 (1996); Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, supra note 6; Samuel
Estreicher, Freedom of Contract and Labor Law Reform: Opening up the Possibilities for ValueAdded Unionism, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 827 (1996); Katherine V. W. Stone, Rethinking Labour Law:
Employment Protections for Boundaryless Workers, in BOUNDARIES AND FRONTIERS OF LABOUR
LAW 155 (Guy Davidov & Brian Langille eds., 2006); Weiler, supra note 6.
72 See Sachs, Employment Law as Labor Law, supra note 8, at 2694–95; see also Estlund, The
Ossification of American Labor Law, supra note 6; Weiler, supra note 6.
73 See Sachs, Employment Law as Labor Law, supra note 8, at 2695 (citing Charles J. Morris,
A Tale of Two Statutes: Discrimination for Union Activity Under the NLRA and RLA, 2 EMP.
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study found that one in five workers who takes an active role in
organizing their workplace is illegally discharged for doing so. 74 The
courts also restrict union organizing and economic activity in ways that
would seem constitutionally problematic if done to other forms of
voluntary associations: organizing drives and peaceful campaigns have
been blocked by RICO, 75 secondary boycotts are prohibited, as is
recognitional and secondary picketing. 76
The conditions for workers with joint employers has also changed
significantly over time, though recently in a way that makes finding a
joint-employer relationship easier than it has been for almost thirty
years. While between 1947 and 1984 joint employer status was found
where an employer had indirect control over, or authority under the
contract to control, a contractor’s employee’s terms and conditions of
work (e.g., wages) and joint-employer status was necessary for
bargaining to be meaningful, 77 that test was curtailed over time. From
the mid-1980s until August 2015, the Board has looked at whether the
putative joint employer had direct and immediate control over things
like hiring, firing, supervision, and direction. 78 After failing to revise this
stricter standard in at least three cases, 79 in Browning-Ferris Industries of
California, the Board decided in a 3-2 split on political lines to return to
the pre-1980s common law test. 80 But while the Board’s reversal, if
conservatives and business interests are unable to get Congress to roll it
back legislatively, 81 will certainly give more contingent and contract
RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 317, 338 (1998)); see also Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law,
supra note 6, at 1537.
74 See Sachs, Employment Law as Labor Law, supra note 8, at 2697 (citing JOHN SCHMITT &
BEN ZIPPERER, CTR. FOR ECON. & POL’Y RES., DROPPING THE AX: ILLEGAL FIRINGS DURING
UNION ELECTION CAMPAIGNS (2007), http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/unions_
2007_01.pdf.
75 See Crain & Matheny, supra note 43, at 577–78 (describing the use of RICO); Charlotte
Garden, Labor Values Are First Amendment Values: Why Union Comprehensive Campaigns Are
Protected Speech, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2617 (2011).
76 See National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 8(b)(4), 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(b)(4), (b)(7) (2012)).
77 See, e.g., Floyd Epperson, 202 N.L.R.B. 23 (1973), enforced, NLRB v. Epperson, 491 F.2d
1390 (6th Cir. 1974); Jewel Tea Co., 162 N.L.R.B. 508 (1966) (finding respondent, who had
indirect control over wages and discipline, joint employer).
78 See TLI, Inc., 271 N.L.R.B. 798 (1984), enforced, Harvey v. New Jersey, 772 F.2d 894 (3d
Cir. 1985); Laerco Transp. & Warehouse, 269 N.L.R.B. 324, 325 (1984).
79 See AM Prop. Holding Corp., 350 N.L.R.B. 998 (2007); Airborne Freight Co., 338
N.L.R.B. 597 (2002); M. B. Sturgis, Inc., 331 N.L.R.B. 1298 (2000). In June 2014, the NLRB
General Counsel filed an amicus brief in Browning-Ferris Industries of California, Inc., NLRA
Case No. 32-RC-109684, asking the Board to reconsider the joint employer standard.
80 See Browning-Ferris Industries of California, Inc., NLRA Case No. 32-RC-109684
(Decided Aug. 27, 2015).
81 See Chris Opfer, Joint Employer Opponents Turn Attention to Congress, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 166, at AA-3 (Aug. 27, 2015); Lydia DePillis, Bracing for Labor Board Decision,
Franchises Spend Recess Courting Democrats, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Aug. 25, 2015), http://
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workers the ability to negotiate with, for instance, franchisors, workers
face another hurdle to bargaining: while a union can organize a
bargaining unit that consists of both temporary and jointly employed
workers with workers who are solely employed by one of those
employers, they can do so only if both employers consent. 82
In addition, two recent cases underscore how labor law imposes
additional costs on unionizing efforts while also shedding light on the
obstacles the law creates for workers and employers to cooperate.
During its October 2013 Term, the Supreme Court heard oral
arguments in Unite Here Local 355 v. Mulhall, a case that was
simultaneously described as “under-the-radar” and “the most significant
labor case in a generation.” 83 On the surface, the case concerned the
legality of a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between a corporation
and union in Florida. In the agreement, the union promised to expend
money and other resources to support a ballot measure that, if passed,
would allow the company to get a gaming license. 84 The union also
agreed to forgo its right to put economic pressure on the employer. 85 In
exchange, the company agreed that if it got the gaming license, it would
remain neutral on union organizing, agree to a card check, and permit
the union access to its property and employees, above what the law
already required. 86 This seemed like a win all around: the company got
help getting the license it needed in order to operate, and the union,
while by no means guaranteed that the company’s employees would
elect it as their bargaining representative, would have ground rules that
would make it easier to promote itself to them for that purpose. The
workers also benefited from both the availability of more jobs (assuming
the company got its license) and additional information about what one
union that wanted to represent them would and would not be able to do
on their behalf if elected (e.g., bargain but not boycott). The plan started
well. The union expended upwards of $100,000 promoting the initiative,

www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonkblog/wp/2015/08/25/bracing-for-labor-board-decisionfranchises-spend-recess-courting-democrats.
82 See H.S. Care L.L.C., 343 N.L.R.B. 659 (2004). The prior test found that the scope of the
bargaining unit should be determined by the work being performed—if both temporary and
regular employees were doing the same work, a single bargaining unit would be appropriate
without employer consent. See M. B. Sturgis, 331 N.L.R.B. 1298. The Board is set to revisit this
question in Miller & Anderson, Inc., Case No. 05-RC-079249 (May 18, 2015) (granting review
of 2012 decision dismissing union election petition).
83 See Josh Eidelson, Scalia’s Chance to Smash Unions: The Huge Under-the-Radar Case,
SALON (Nov. 13, 2013, 8:30 AM), http://www.salon.com/2013/11/13/scalias_chance_to_smash_
unions_the_huge_under_the_radar_case.
84 See Mulhall v. Unite Here Local 355, 667 F.3d 1211, 1213 (11th Cir. 2012).
85 See id.
86 See id.
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which passed, and the company received a gaming license. 87 Soon,
however, the company told the union that it would not honor its side of
the bargain. 88 It did not have to do so, the company asserted, because
the entire MOA was illegal from the start. 89 Section 302(a)(2) of the
Labor-Management Relations Act makes it a crime for an employer “to
pay, lend, or deliver, or agree to pay, lend, or deliver any money or other
thing of value” to “any labor organization . . . which represents, seeks to
represent, or would admit to membership, any of the employees of such
employer.”90 And, as the company now saw it, the MOA was a thing of
value; it had agreed to pay or deliver to the union. Parting ways with
both the Third and Fourth Circuits, which both held MOAs were not
“things of value” implicating section 302 at all, the Eleventh Circuit held
that MOAs could indeed violate section 302, depending on the intent of
the parties. 91 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and heard oral
arguments. However, because the Court eventually dismissed the writ as
improvidently granted, the circuit split remains. 92 Where MOAs are
vulnerable to section 302 challenges, we should expect to see less
unionization. While unions win approximately seventy-eight percent of
campaigns conducted under MOAs that include card checks, without
them, that number drops to forty-five percent. 93
Both section 302 and section 8(a)(2) were also in play in the recent
Volkswagen unionization efforts. In February 2014, employees at the
German car manufacturer’s Chattanooga, Tennessee assembly plant
voted on whether to join the United Auto Workers (UAW). While no
foreign car manufacturer has ever successfully been unionized in the
United States, VW “hinted [it] might even prefer having a union.” 94 The
reason: VW’s international labor relations. Specifically, VW has work
See Mulhall v. Unite Here Local 355, 618 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2010).
See id.
89 See id.
90 As will also be relevant, section 302 prohibits an employer to provide things of value
to any employee or group or committee of employees of such employer . . . in excess
of their normal compensation for the purpose of causing such employee or group
committee directly or indirectly to influence any other employees in the exercise of
the right to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing.
29 U.S.C. § 186(a)(3) (2012).
91 See Adcock v. Freightliner LLC, 550 F.3d 369, 374 (4th Cir. 2008); Hotel Emp.’s & Rest.
Emp.’s Union, Local 57 v. Sage Hosp. Res., LLC, 390 F.3d 206, 219 (3d Cir. 2004).
92 See Unite Here Local 355 v. Mulhall, 134 S. Ct. 594 (2013) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
93 See Labor’s Supreme Test, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 14, 2013 9:58 PM), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/SB10001424052702303460004579191820419342020. That is to say nothing of how
many unions never get sufficient worker support to even have an election in the first instance.
94 Steven Greenhouse, Outsiders, Not Auto Plant, Battle U.A.W. in Tennessee, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 28, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/29/business/outsiders-not-auto-plant-battleuaw-in-tennessee.html?_r=0.
87
88
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councils for blue and white-collar employees outside of the United
States, with each of its over one-hundred major factories holding a seat
on the VW Global Group Works Council. 95 Each, that is, except
Chattanooga. 96 VW wanted to change that. As VW said in a joint press
release with the UAW, VW saw giving workers an “integral role in
managing the company” as “a fundamental part of their global business
model and . . . a key factor in Volkswagen’s success.” 97 The work council
was how VW went about doing that.
The problem, though, was that bringing the VW Global Group
Works Council structure to Chattanooga was thought to violate both
section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA and 302 of the LMRA. Similar in scope to
section 302 of the LMRA, section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA makes it an
unfair labor practice for an employer to “dominate or interfere with the
formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute
financial or other support to it.” 98 In other words, VW creating or even
contributing financially to the work council, which would meet the
definition of a “labor organization,” was unlawful. The company
thought the solution was to enter into an MOA with the UAW whereby
Volkswagen would stay neutral on organizing in exchange for, among
other things, the UAW’s support, if elected, in creating a work council
that would not violate section 8(a)(2). 99
In response, the National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation
filed suit on behalf of a few VW workers, alleging the MOA violated
section 302. 100 The lawsuit was later withdrawn, however, when the
UAW lost 712-626. 101 As a result, Chattanooga remains unrepresented
on the VW Global Group Works Council. Instead, VW created a
95 See Andreas Cremer, VW Paves Way for UAW Representation at U.S. Plant, REUTERS
(Nov. 12, 2014, 3:01 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/12/us-volkswagen-uawidUSKCN0IW2EP20141112.
96 Id.
97 Press Release, Volkswagen Grp. Of Am. & United Auto Workers, Co-Determining the
Future: A New Labor Mode (Mar. 12, 2014), https://web.archive.org/web/20140312152105/
http://uaw.org/sites/default/files/VW%20Media%20Background%20Sheet.pdf.
98 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (2012).
99 See Complaint, Burton v. UAW, No. 1:14-cv-00076 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 12, 2014), http://
nashvillepublicmedia.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/1-Complaint.pdf (No. 1:14-cv-00076).
100 Id. at 1.
101 Paul M. Barrett, UAW’s Devastating Defeat in Tennessee: Four Blunt Points, BLOOMBERG
BUS. (Feb. 17, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-02-17/uaws-devastatingdefeat-at-a-tennessee-volkswagen-plant-four-blunt-points. The loss came after Tennessee
lawmakers threatened to withhold tax incentives from VW if the union won. See Gabe Nelson,
Tenn. Politicians Threaten to Kill VW Incentives if UAW Wins Election, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS
(Feb. 10, 2014, 4:23 PM), http://www.autonews.com/article/20140210/OEM01/140219986/
tenn.-politicians-threaten-to-kill-vw-incentives-if-uaw-wins-election; see also Benjamin Sachs,
Conditioning Tax Incentives on VW’s Union Status?, ONLABOR (Feb. 11, 2014), http://
onlabor.org/2014/02/11/conditioning-tax-incentives-on-vws-union-status.
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Chattanooga-specific representation system it believes complies with
section 8(a)(2). Under the adopted system, VW created tiers, in which
labor organizations get different privileges depending on the percentage
of workers they represent. The top level, which UAW achieved with
forty-five percent of workers, provides access to plant property for
meetings with members and the company. Unlike the Global Work
Council, though, the UAW does not get to actually bargain with VW. 102
In other words, while VW wanted to work and bargain with its
Chattanooga employees through its robust Global Work Council, which
has the power to negotiate with VW over a litany of issues ranging from
workplace conditions to job security, federal labor law prohibited VW
from doing so. 103
Twenty-five states and counting have also passed “right to work”
legislation—legislation that imposes financial costs on unions that are
elected. 104 Under these laws, employers and unions are statutorily
prohibited from contracting to require non-union members of
bargaining units to pay for the services the union is legally required to
provide them. 105 And when state-level right to work laws have failed,
right to work activists have pushed local governments to pass city
versions. 106 A de facto right to work regime may also be coming soon to
public sector workers. In June 2015, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association, where the
Court will decide whether requiring union-represented public sector
employees to pay their share of the costs that the union bears in
negotiating and executing the collective bargaining agreement violates
the First Amendment. 107 The Court already held such arrangements
violate the First Amendment for home health care providers in Harris v.

102 VOLKSWAGEN GRP. OF AM., COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION ENGAGEMENT (2014), http://
onlabor.files.wordpress.com/2014/11/vw-communityorganizationengagement.pdf.
103 As discussed in Part III, some would argue that even this limited recognition and dealing
violates section 302. See infra Section III.A.
104 See Alejandra Cancino, Illinois Unions Ramp Up to Thwart “Right to Work”, CHI. TRIB.
(Mar. 13, 2015, 4:08 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-right-to-work-illinois0316-biz-20150313-story.html.
105 For scholarly criticism of the federal duty of fair representation and state rules
prohibiting compensation for those costs, see Catherine L. Fisk & Benjamin I. Sachs, Restoring
Equity in Right-to-Work, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 857, 857–59 (2014).
106 See Cancino, supra note 104 (“In Kentucky[,] . . . conservative groups are pushing for
local right-to-work laws after statewide proposals have failed. At least 10 Kentucky counties
have approved the measures, which unions are fighting in courts, arguing that only states have
the power to enact such laws.”); Right-to-Work: Local Governments Test Limits of Labor Laws,
ST. J. (Aug. 5, 2015, 8:33 AM), http://www.state-journal.com/zillow/2015/08/05/right-to-worklocal-governments-test-limits-of-labor-laws.
107 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 2933 (2015)
(No. 14–915), 2015 WL 393856.
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Quinn. 108 In short, the federal labor law regime makes traditional
unionizing both difficult and costly. It is not surprising that workers
look to non-union alternatives.
C.

The Consumer Market for “Ethically Made” Goods and Services

While the changing nature of work and current labor law motivate
workers to find alternative means of organizing, consumer demand for
ethical companies and products has also affected the development and
strategies of these worker organizations. 109
Throughout history, those concerned with the treatment of
workers have developed initiatives designed to increase consumer
demand for ethically sourced products. Quaker abolitionists promoted
the buying of slavery-free cotton and fruit, workers politicized
consumption through boycotts, cooperatives, and the promotion of
“union made” labels, 110 and at least since the mid-1980s “fair trade,”
“locally made,” and “sweatshop-free” labels attempt to do the same. 111
Companies, aware of this consumer demand and the fact that some
consumers are willing to pay a premium for products they believe to be
ethically sourced, have tried to capitalize on this by positioning
themselves as socially responsible sellers of ethically produced goods. 112
Consumer demand for products made by workers who are treated
“well” has the potential to help improve the conditions of work. If a
Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014).
See M. Todd Henderson & Anup Malani, Corporate Philanthropy and the Market for
Altruism, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 571, 573 (2009) (defining this as the “market for altruism,” a
demand for the good-feeling that comes when others’ lives are improved).
110 See DANA FRANK, PURCHASING POWER: CONSUMER ORGANIZING, GENDER, AND THE
SEATTLE LABOR MOVEMENT, 1919–1929, at 225 (1994).
111 The Fair Trade label can be traced to 1988 and a church-based NGO in the Netherlands.
The first “fair trade” started in the 1950s when the European Alternative Trade Organization
began direct trade with producers in developing countries thought disadvantaged.
112 See Jens Hainmueller et al., Consumer Demand for Fair Trade: Evidence from a Multistore
Field Experiment, 97 REV. ECON. & STAT. 242 (2015), http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/
10.1162/REST_a_00467#.VjUcRoS4k0o (“[S]ales of the two most popular coffees rose by almost
10% when they carried a Fair Trade label as compared to a generic placebo label. Demand for
the higher-priced coffee remained steady when its price was raised by 8%, but demand for the
lower-priced coffee was elastic: a 9% price increase led to a 30% decline in sales.”); Michael J.
Hiscox et al., Consumer Demand for Fair Labor Standards: Evidence from a Field Experiment
on eBay (Apr. 12, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1811788 (finding that consumers on eBay were willing to pay a 45% premium for
shirts labeled SA8000-certified over unlabeled shirts); Remi Trudel & June Cotte, Does it Pay to
Be Good?, MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV., Winter 2009, http://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/does-itpay-to-be-good (“Consumers are in fact willing to pay more for ethically produced goods.
Consumers will demand a substantial discount from companies that produce goods in an
unethical manner.”).
108
109
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company realizes it can increase profits by paying its workers more, the
company has a good reason to do so. The danger, from the perspective
of the would-be worker beneficiaries, is the possibility that some
companies that promote itself as paying its workers a “living wage” or
“fairly” (or whatever else consumers want), are able to reap the benefits
of those commitments without actually making good on them.
Take Wal-Mart for example. Wal-Mart has a “Responsible
Sourcing” Code of Ethics with which its suppliers are to comply. The
first line of the Code states, “[t]he safety and well being of workers
across our supply chain is the Responsible Sourcing group’s top
priority.”113 It includes things like prohibitions on slave, child, and
indentured labor, human trafficking, and requires suppliers to take steps
to prevent workplace health and safety hazards. There is also a provision
protecting worker freedom of association and collective bargaining. 114
This all sounds like Wal-Mart is improving the conditions of work for
workers in its supply chain, something traditional unions attempt to
achieve through collective bargaining, and something conscious
consumers would find attractive. But as a recent report from the Food
Chain Workers Alliance notes, “Walmart’s commitments to improving
standards appear to be mostly a public relations stunt and haven’t
translated to improvements in conditions for most of its food supply
chain.”115 The co-director of the Food Chain Workers Alliance states,
“[t]here is absolutely no way of verifying their claims or of ensuring that
the claims are systemic and creating the kinds of conditions, in terms of
workplaces and environment, that we need for food to be healthy and
procured without suffering.” 116
Nestlé provides another example. One of its corporate business
principles is the protection of human rights and the elimination of all
forms of forced or compulsory labor, stating publically that it
“require[s] [its] suppliers, agents, subcontractors and their employees
to . . . adhere to [its Supplier Code],” which itself states that “Supplier
must under no circumstances use, or in any other way benefit, from
forced labour.”117 However, a July 2015 New York Times exposé
113 Standards for Suppliers, WALMART, http://corporate.walmart.com/global-responsibility/
ethical-sourcing/standards-for-suppliers (last visited Oct. 31, 2015).
114 See id.
115 FOOD CHAIN WORKERS ALL., WALMART AT THE CROSSROADS: THE ENVIRONMENTAL
AND LABOR IMPACT OF ITS FOOD SUPPLY CHAIN 1 (Erika A. Inwald ed., 2015), http://
foodchainworkers.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Walmart-at-the-Crossroads-FINAL06.04.15.pdf.
116 Eliza Barclay, The Salt: Why Wal-Mart’s Labor Issues Run Deeper than Too Much Justin
Bieber, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (June 5, 2015, 1:41 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2015/
06/05/411978638/why-wal-marts-labor-issues-run-deeper-than-too-much-justin-bieber.
117 See NESTLÉ, THE NESTLÉ SUPPLIER CODE 2 (2013), https://www.nestle.com/asset-library/
documents/library/documents/suppliers/supplier-code-english.pdf.
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documented how Nestlé and other companies used fish caught by “sea
slaves” in their pet foods like Fancy Feast. 118 While the company’s
“Nestlé in Society Full Report 2014,” which discusses its human rights
program, states that its main seafood supplier in Thailand is working
with an independent consulting firm to trace its products through the
supply chain, the report does not disclose whether there have been any
known instances of forced labor in its supply chain. 119 Instead it merely
states that its “ambition is to confirm that the fish and seafood [it]
source[s] comes from healthy fisheries or from fisheries and farms
engaged in improvement projects.” 120 Now, some California Fancy Feast
purchasers have filed a class action again the company for violations of
California’s consumer protection laws. Among other things, the
plaintiffs allege that the company’s failure to disclose the use of forced
labor in its supply chain was a material omission. 121
The combination of consumer demand for ethically-created
products and the difficulty of distinguishing the wheat from the chaff
poses a real risk for the workers who stand to benefit. 122 When
consumers continue to receive the utility from thinking they purchased
from morally preferred companies, and dishonest companies continue
to receive undue profits, the very workers consumers are trying to
benefit are potentially left in a worse position. If the segment of the
public who cares about workers enough to pay for their better treatment
thinks they are already helping them, those same people may be less
inclined to look for other ways to help those same workers. 123 For
118 See Ian Urbina, ‘Sea Slaves’: The Human Misery that Feeds Pets and Livestock, N.Y. TIMES
(July 27, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/27/world/outlaw-ocean-thailand-fishing-seaslaves-pets.html.
119 See NESTLÉ, NESTLÉ IN SOCIETY: CREATING SHARED VALUE AND MEETING OUR
COMMITMENTS 2014, at 122, http://www.nestle.com/asset-library/documents/library/
documents/corporate_social_responsibility/nestle-csv-full-report-2014-en.pdf.
120 See id.
121 See Complaint, Barber v. Nestlé USA, Inc., No. 8:15-cv-1364 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2015),
2015 WL 5062446.
122 This is the labor equivalent of “greenwashing.” That is, spending money on advertising
and marketing that lets the company claim to be green or good to workers instead of actually
becoming so, which would require the implementation of new business practices. See About
Greenwashing,
GREENWASHING
INDEX,
http://www.greenwashingindex.com/aboutgreenwashing (last visited Mar. 23, 2016). An example in the greenwashing context being “a
hotel chain that calls itself ‘green’ because it allows guests to choose to sleep on the same sheets
and reuse towels, but actually does very little to save water and energy where it counts—on its
grounds, with its appliances and lighting, in its kitchens, and with its vehicle fleet.” Id. If hotel
guests think the hotel is already “green,” there is less a chance those consumers will pressure the
company to change its practices to do more. Id.
123 This of course assumes that if the consumer willing to pay a $x premium for products
made by workers treated well knew that that product was in fact not made by workers treated
well, she would look to put $x toward another product or initiative that did satisfy her desire to
help workers.
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consumers and the general public to think their purchase decisions are
helping workers when they are not is particularly bad for workers today,
when a majority of Americans are concerned about income
inequality, 124 and support for minimum wage increases is up.125 If the
public thinks companies are improving their employment practices,
momentum for legislative action may wane.
This same difficulty of distinguishing among companies in this
market also makes it harder for workers to leverage consumer demand
for the improved treatment of workers in the future. As economists
would say, we have the makings of a “market for lemons.”126 That is,
because companies can reap the benefits of making commitments to do
good things without following through, those companies that truly are
committed to, for example, treating workers well, have less of an
incentive to do so, as they cannot reap the benefits, but do still pay the
higher costs.
Recognizing the limits of market and litigation-based solutions, 127
workers have responded to the potential and pitfalls of this consumer
124 See Aaron Blake, Why Income Inequality Is No Silver Bullet for Democrats and Hillary
Clinton, WASH. POST (May 6, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/
05/06/why-hillary-clintons-income-inequality-argument-is-no-silver-bullet (“Poll after poll
shows a huge majority of Americans are concerned about income inequality. A recent
Washington Post-ABC News poll showed 83 percent of Americans say the wealth gap is a
problem . . . .”).
125 See Andrew Dugan, Most Americans for Raising Minimum Wage, GALLUP (Nov. 11,
2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/165794/americans-raising-minimum-wage.aspx (“With
momentum building at the federal and state level to increase hourly base pay, more than threequarters of Americans (76%) say they would vote for raising the minimum wage to $9 per hour
(it is currently $7.25) in a hypothetical national referendum, a five-percentage-point increase
since March.”). In August 2015 the Democratic National Committee voted unanimously to
approve a resolution to support raising the federal minimum wage to $15 an hour. See Chris
Opher, Democrats Unanimously Back $15 Minimum Wage, BLOOMBERG BNA (Sept. 8, 2015),
http://www.bna.com/democrats-unanimously-back-n17179935669.
126 See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanisms, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970).
127 By way of example, the enforceability of commitments made in employee handbooks is a
source of constant uncertainty. While today the majority of courts find that employee
handbooks can alter the employment contract (typically changing the employment relation
from at-will to for-cause), many of the sorts of more generalized commitments and policy
statements workers rely on when choosing where and how hard to work are often not definite
and specific enough to receive protection under contract law. See Avoiding & Def. Wrongful
Discharge Cl. § 2:24 (2015). And at least nine jurisdictions find that unless the handbook
promises are put in an express employment contract, they do not create enforceable
employment contracts at all. Id.; see also Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory
Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 674 (1984) (discussing how low
quality sellers mimic the disclosure of facts buyers can verify while “making bogus statements
about things” they cannot); Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace, supra note 14, at 322
(“Observers from a range of perspectives have argued that the postwar regime of commandand-control regulation is losing its grip in the face of rapidly changing markets, technology, and
firm structures; and that civil litigation is a costly, slower, and often inaccessible mechanism for
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demand by putting pressure on reputation-sensitive companies to agree
to outside monitoring by, among others, alternative forms of worker
organizations. 128 And for good reason: experience has shown
monitoring company compliance with worker-focused laws is more
effective when workers themselves are involved. 129
II. CASE STUDIES OF EMPLOYER-LABOR ORGANIZATION
COLLABORATIONS
When Americans think of worker organizations, they think of
unions. I suspect they think of a teachers’ union striking in Chicago,
Sally Fields holding up a “UNION” sign in Norma Rae, or, if they
watched The Wire, a union leader who becomes involved in organized
crime as union work dries up. But regardless of which specific image
comes to mind, underneath I suspect Americans think of self-funded
organizations comprised of workers and union leaders that bargain
exclusively, as a matter of NLRA-given right, with those workers’
employer. While prevalent, this image of worker organization overlooks
a wide swath of non-union worker organizations that also can provide
benefits to workers. 130 And indeed, the confluence of changes in the
nature of work, an increasingly unattractive labor law regime, and
consumer demand for companies that treat workers well, has pushed
workers to experiment with these nontraditional forms. 131 And among
these organizations, there has been further experimentation with
regards to employer collaborations.
There are various explanations for why these organizations find
relationships with employers advantageous. For one, because non-union
forms of worker organizations lack dues-paying members, they also lack
securing workplace rights.” (footnote omitted)); Kent Greenfield, The Unjustified Absence of
Federal Fraud Protection in the Labor Market, 107 YALE L.J. 715, 765 (1997); William S. Laufer,
Social Accountability and Corporate Greenwashing, 43 J. BUS. ETHICS 253 (2003) (arguing that,
after citing scholars who have criticized corporate health and safety reports as “simply token
efforts” lacking credible and verifiable information finds, “relying on the integrity of corporate
representations should seem increasingly naïve to those inside and outside the SRI community,
particularly in the wake of the recent accounting scandals in the United States”).
128 See discussion infra Part II.
129 See Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace, supra note 14, at 372 (“Experience
under the code of conduct regimes has suggested that effective monitoring requires the
participation of workers.”).
130 Indeed, the public perception of unions today glosses over the heterogeneity of even
more traditional unions’ goals of the early twentieth century. See DAVID MONTGOMERY, THE
FALL OF THE HOUSE OF LABOR: THE WORKPLACE, THE STATE, AND AMERICAN LABOR
ACTIVISM, 1865–1925, at 6 (1987).
131 See Crain & Matheny, supra note 43, at 580 (“Union decline has not spelled the end of
group action by workers.”); Sachs, Employment Law as Labor Law, supra note 8.
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revenue. 132 Relationships with employers may be a partial solution to a
funding problem. Alternatively, the organizations may come to believe
that supply chains and other fissured workplaces are best improved by
creating an ongoing relationship with the longest-term player: the endof-chain, brand name company. And, these organizations may also
recognize that at least some brand name companies are selling
themselves to consumers as being ethical, which makes those companies
vulnerable to the sorts of reputational damage the worker organization
could inflict if the company fails to make good on its do-good
commitments. And that risk, in turn, may make negotiating a mutually
beneficial partnership with such companies possible and worthwhile.
For other companies, working with worker organizations may make
sense as a way to distinguish themselves as particularly good for
workers. Employers have made such a calculus in the past. During the
widespread promotion of the “buy union” label in the 1910s, for
instance, companies realized that “label endorsement could often be so
lucrative as to allow a manufacturer to forgo advertising altogether, as
the free publicity more than compensated for higher production
costs.” 133
Regardless of the reasons, experimentation with company
partnerships has begun between organizations supporting workers both
within and outside of NLRA coverage. However, because labor law
prohibits employer support of “labor organizations,” experimentation
for workers within NLRA coverage requires inefficient workarounds
and behaviors that may ultimately be held unlawful. Below are examples
of nontraditional worker organizations and collaborations happening
today. Each provide reasons to believe that collaborations with
companies have, or in the future could, provide additional benefits to
workers.
A.

Examples from Outside NLRA Coverage

While the NLRA covers employees, it does not cover all employees,
let alone all workers. Agricultural laborers, domestic workers, and
independent contractors are examples of groups excluded. 134 For these
workers, who make up an increasingly large share of the American

132 See Crain & Matheny, supra note 43, at 579 (“Alternative forms of worker advocacy face
the twin challenges of sustaining themselves over time without a stable membership base and a
source of revenue.”).
133 See FRANK, supra note 110, at 206.
134 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2012).
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workforce, NLRA-backed unionization is not available. 135 And it is
because these organizations fall outside of NLRA coverage that we see
cooperation between these organizations and companies in ways that
has helped some of the worst off workers. The following are a few
examples.
1.

Industry-Wide Organizations

Worker centers, while hard to define, are community-based
organizations that provide support to and help organize communities of
low-wage workers who do not have access to a traditional union.136
They have “emerged in response to the decline of institutions that
historically provided workers with a vehicle for collective action.” 137
Much like the mutual aid societies of the pre-NLRA nineteenth and
early twentieth century, these organizations vary in their shape and size
but generally provide some combination of: services (e.g., legal
assistance to health clinics and education), advocacy (research, lobbying,
and monitors), organizing outside the workplace (for economic action
and policy change), and coalition building (with religious groups,
government agencies, and other community organizations). 138
The New York Taxi Workers Alliance is a worker center. The
organization started in 1997 in New York City as an offshoot of the
Leased Drivers Coalition. 139 While in the past taxi drivers were the
employees of medallion owners, over time, medallion owners realized
the benefits of classifying taxi drivers as independent contractors who
leased out the right to use their medallion (and thus drive a taxi). 140
Once independent contractors, the drivers were unable to unionize
under the NLRA. 141 With traditional unionization and collective
bargaining off the table, a group created the Alliance, which advocated
135 A study by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Government Accountability Office
show that there are over 20 million independent contractors today. A 2006 report from the
Government Accountability Office, the last one released, showed that 42.6 million workers,
thirty percent of the American workforce, were independent contractors or contingent. One
highly cited 2010 study estimates that by 2020, more than forty percent of the U.S. workforce,
sixty million people, will be “contingent workers,” which means either contractors, temps, or
independent contractors. INTUIT, INTUIT 2020 REPORT: TWENTY TRENDS THAT WILL SHAPE
THE NEXT DECADE 20–21 (2010), http://http-download.intuit.com/http.intuit/CMO/intuit/
futureofsmallbusiness/intuit_2020_report.pdf.
136 See FINE, supra note 9, at 12–14.
137 Id. at 14.
138 See id. at 12–14.
139 See id. at 137. Mutual aid societies “were once central to the provision of sickness, burial,
and life insurance.” Id. at 36.
140 See id. at 136.
141 See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2012).
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on drivers’ behalf with the regulatory authorities, in addition to
providing free and discounted legal support on taxi-related issues and
help on issues surrounding immigration, health, and computer
training. 142
Partnerships between the Taxi Worker Alliance and medallion
owners could come in a variety of shapes. 143 To the extent the market for
taxi drivers is competitive, medallion owners need to offer drivers
additional compensation. Drivers, as independent contractors, do not
receive health and other benefits as part of their compensation from
medallion-owning companies. We can imagine, however, that
medallion owners might want to find a way to offer those benefits while
not taking on employer status. Offering to subsidize drivers’
membership fees in the Alliance is one way to do that. For a medallion
owner, subsidizing the Alliance is in essence a way to efficiently
outsource the provision of certain goods workers demand. And indeed,
something like this is already developing for on-demand drivers.
Groove, which sells itself as a driver “clubhouse,” offers San Francisco
“on demand” drivers from companies like Lyft and Uber a 24-hour
community space where they can get free coffee, access Wi-Fi, access a
bathroom, and buy food. 144 Groove is also working on providing
additional services in the future, including classes on how to get better
tips, use technology, and manage income. 145 As Groove told reporters,
while it currently charges drivers thirty dollars per month for
membership, they “hope[] . . . ride companies will buy memberships for
their fleets.” 146 Breeze, a company that leases cars to ride-service drivers,
has already done so. 147
While Groove is nascent, it hints at how a non-union form of
worker organization could partner with companies to provide workers
the kinds of goods they want but companies may find too costly to
provide directly. The worker organization develops, gains recognition
and credibility in the driver market, and then partners with employers.
The employer subsidizes worker membership and in exchange can
signal to the driver market the credibility of its commitment to treat its
See FINE, supra note 9, at 137.
However, antitrust worries will persist in the background. While Norris-LaGuardia and
the Clayton Act expressly make antitrust laws inapplicable to labor organizations and labor
groups, see 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2012); 29 U.S.C. §§ 101, 105, the Supreme Court has held that does
not include an organization of independent contractors. See H.A. Artists & Assocs., Inc. v.
Actors’ Equity Ass’n, 451 U.S. 704 (1981); United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
144 See Carolyn Said, There’s Now a Clubhouse for Uber, Lyft, Sidecar Drivers, SFGATE (Jan.
8, 2015, 6:46 PM), http://www.sfgate.com/business/article/There-s-now-a-clubhouse-for-UberLyft-Sidecar-6002951.php.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id.
142
143
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drivers well. At the same time, the employer reaps potential reputational
benefits if the worker organization then promotes its company over
others.
Depending on the particulars, this arrangement could avoid
sections 8(a)(2) and 302. If all drivers are independent contractors, the
NLRA is avoided. However, as discussed in Part III, the classification of
these drivers as independent contractors has been hotly contested, with
the California Labor Commissioner finding an Uber driver an employee
and a California district court denying Uber’s motion for summary
judgment that the Plaintiff-drivers were independent contractors as a
matter of law. 148 If we then assume the organization caters to both
drivers who are employees and independent contractors, the bans on
company support may still be avoided, so long as the organization does
not “deal with” employers over “grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates
of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work.” 149 However, if the
organization begins putting pressure on companies to subsidize their
workers’ membership in the organization or has discussions with
companies about which benefits to provide or how much money the
employer companies should pay, dealing may be present, and the
relevant bans will kick in.
2.

Vertical Organizations

In addition to worker centers, workers who fall outside NLRA
coverage have also created organizations that resemble trade
associations. These organizations are particularly interesting, having
helped some of the worst off workers by creating highly effective
company partnerships whereby the partnership organization not only
sets standards but provides direct goods to workers and acts as a thirdparty monitor of the company’s commitments—and they do all this by
accepting funding from companies.
One example begins with the Coalition of Immokalee Workers, a
worker center started in 1993 by Florida tomato pickers as a way to fight
low pay, slavery, and indentured servitude among Florida farm
workers. 150 In 2011, the Coalition launched the Fair Food Program. 151
148 See Order, Barbara Ann Berwick v. Uber Technologies, Inc., Case No. 11-46739, Labor
Commissioner of the State of California (June 3, 2015); Order, O’Connor v. Uber Technologies,
Inc., Case No. C-13-3826 (March 11, 2015).
149 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (2012).
150 The Coalition describes itself as a “worker-based human rights organization.” About
CIW, COALITION IMMOKALEE WORKERS, http://ciw-online.org/about (last visited Oct. 31,
2015). Agricultural laborers have been described by the Department of Labor as “a labor force
in significant economic distress” with “[l]ow wages, sub-poverty annual earnings, [and]
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The Program creates a partnership among farm workers, Florida tomato
growers, and buyers, whereby buyer-companies, from Whole Foods to
Walmart, sign a binding Fair Food Agreement that requires them to pay
a premium on the price for tomatoes. 152 That premium, a cent per
pound, goes directly to workers as a line-item bonus. 153 Buyers who sign
onto the Program also agree to only buy from farms that adhere to the
Fair Food Program Code of Conduct. 154 In other words, signatories
agree to require all the tomato suppliers in their supply chain to agree to
the Fair Food Program Code of Conduct as a condition of doing
business.
The Code of Conduct requires supplier-farms to allow the
Coalition to go on-site to provide workers education and monitor
ongoing compliance. 155 The Fair Food Standards Council oversees
compliance; its Board of Directors includes a retired judge, academics,
human rights workers, the General Counsel of the Coalition of
Immokalee Workers, and two other members of the Coalition. 156 The
Program has received a number of awards and was declared the “single
most effective prevention program in the U.S. agricultural industry” by
PBS Frontline. 157
In January 2015, Fresh Market, a small competitor of Whole Foods,
signed a Fair Food agreement with the Coalition. The company said,
“being a part of the FFP [Fair Food Program] helps us to know we are
sourcing from growers whose practices are fair and socially responsible.
This allows us to provide our customers with food they can feel good
about purchasing and enjoy sharing with friends and family.” 158 As part

significant periods of un- and underemployment.” U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, THE AGRICULTURAL
LABOR MARKET—STATUS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2000), https://migration.ucdavis.edu/rmn/
word-etc/dec_2000_labor.htm.
151 See About CIW, supra note 150.
152 See id.
153 See id.; Steven Greenhouse, In Florida Tomato Fields, a Penny Buys Progress, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 24, 2014) [hereinafter Greenhouse, In Florida Tomato Fields, a Penny Buys Progress],
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/25/business/in-florida-tomato-fields-a-penny-buysprogress.html.
154 See Greenhouse, In Florida Tomato Fields, a Penny Buys Progress, supra note 153.
155 See id.
156 See FAIR FOOD STANDARDS COUNCIL, FAIR FOOD PROGRAM: 2014 ANNUAL REPORT,
http://www.fairfoodstandards.org/reports/14SOTP-Web.pdf.
157 FAIR FOOD STANDARDS COUNCIL, FAIR FOOD PROGRAM: REPORT, 2011–2013 (2013),
http://fairfoodstandards.org/cms/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/13SOTP-Web.pdf;
Richard
Chin Quee, Rape in the Fields: A Frontline/Univision Investigation, WGCU (June 19, 2013),
http://news.wgcu.org/post/rape-fields-frontlineunivision-investigation.
158 Press Release, Coal. of Immokalee Workers, Fresh Market Signs Fair Food Agreement
with CIW! (Jan. 8, 2015), http://ciw-online.org/blog/2015/01/fresh-market-signs.
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of the agreement, Fresh Market agreed to make an annual contribution
to support the Council. 159
In July 2015, Ahold USA, the parent company of Stop & Shop,
Giant Foods, Martin’s, and the online grocer Peapod, also signed on to
the Fair Food Program. As part of the agreement, Ahold USA agreed to
require its Florida tomato farmers to permit the Coalition on for
inspections and audits, pay a premium on tomatoes, provide the
organization with marketing and advertising, including in-store
displays, and provide financial support for the Fair Food Standards
Council. 160 So long as this program only supports agricultural workers,
who are not covered by the NLRA, sections 8(a)(2) and 302 are not a
problem. 161
Outside the United States, another example of a company-labor
partnership that takes the form of a hybrid trade association/third-party
monitor is the Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh. In
April 2013, the Rana Plaza factory collapsed in Bangladesh, killing more
than 1100 people and injuring 2000 more. It remains the deadliest
garment factory accident in history. 162 The event also became something
of a public relations nightmare once it came out that a number of highprofile clothing companies outsourced manufacturing to the factories
housed in the buildings, where safety violations were rampant and
oversight non-existent. 163
In response, a combination of 200 apparel companies and retailers
signed on to the Accord, along with both unions and human rights
organizations. 164 The Accord is described as a “five year independent,
legally binding agreement between global brands and retailers and trade
unions designed to build a safe and healthy Bangladeshi Ready Made
Garment (RMG) Industry.” 165 Under the agreement, signatories commit
See id.
See Ahold USA Press Release, supra note 39.
161 See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2012).
162 See Sarah Butler, Bangladesh Garment Workers Still Vulnerable a Year After Rana Plaza,
GUARDIAN (Apr. 24, 2014, 2:48 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/24/
bangladesh-garment-workers-rights-rana-plaza-disaster; Jim Yardley, Report on Deadly Factory
Collapse in Bangladesh Finds Widespread Blame, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2013), http://
www.nytimes.com/2013/05/23/world/asia/report-on-bangladesh-building-collapse-findswidespread-blame.html.
163 See Steven Greenhouse, 3 Retailers Give Aid to Bangladesh Workers, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28,
2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/29/business/international/3-retailers-give-to-aidbangladesh-workers.html; Amber Hildebrandt, Bangladesh’s Rana Plaza Factory Collapse Spurs
Change, Finger-Pointing, CBC NEWS CAN. (Apr. 24, 2014, 9:33 PM), http://www.cbc.ca/m/
touch/news/story/1.2619524.
164 Signatories,
ACCORD ON FIRE & BUILDING SAFETY BANGLADESH, http://
bangladeshaccord.org/signatories (last visited Jan. 19, 2016).
165 About the Accord, ACCORD ON FIRE & BUILDING SAFETY BANGLADESH, http://
bangladeshaccord.org/about (last visited Oct. 31, 2015).
159
160
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to establish a fire and building safety program in Bangladesh that covers
all suppliers producing products for the signatory companies. 166 The
signatories’ suppliers are then required to undergo safety inspections,
remediation, and fire safety training. 167 The Accord’s Steering
Committee oversees and approves of the inspection programs168 and has
equal representation of brand name companies and trade unions, along
with a neutral chair from the International Labour Organisation. 169 In
addition to inspections and training, the Accord mandates the creation
of worker-management safety and health committees, where workers in
the individual factories have the power and support to contribute to
inspections, monitoring, and implementing safety provisions. 170 Where
unions are not present, the Accord facilitates the elections; where there
are unions, no less than 50% of the committee must be chosen by the
union. 171 The entire Accord receives financial support from each
company signatory, set annually based on a sliding scale with a
maximum contribution of $500,000 per year. 172
By creating an organization comprised of companies, worker
organizations, and other human rights groups, the parties created a
monitoring system that benefits both the companies, vis-à-vis their
relationships with consumers and potential regulators, and Bangladeshi
workers, who otherwise have almost zero bargaining power. And, in
order to have that desired effect, companies and workers saw it in their
interest to create not only a third-party monitor but also an
organization that could go into the factories and provide training and
on-the-ground resources that facilitate ongoing compliance. For such a
large undertaking, the financial support of the reputation-sensitive
brand name companies was likely necessary. And indeed, such support
makes sense; those companies stand to benefit financially from the
cleaner supply chain the organization’s work facilitates.

166 BANGLADESH ACCORD SECRETARIAT, ACCORD ON FIRE & BUILDING SAFETY IN
BANGLADESH, INTRODUCTION TO ACCORD ON FIRE & BUILDING SAFETY IN BANGLADESH
(2015), http://bangladeshaccord.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/the_accord.pdf.
167 See id.
168 See ACCORD ON FIRE & BUILDING SAFETY IN BANGLADESH, REGULATIONS (ADOPTED
24TH SEPTEMBER 2013)—AMENDED AT SC MEETING 10TH JULY 2014 [hereinafter BANGLADESH
ACCORD
REGULATIONS],
http://bangladeshaccord.org/wp-content/uploads/GovernanceRegulations.pdf.
169 See Governance, ACCORD ON FIRE & BUILDING SAFETY BANGLADESH, http://
bangladeshaccord.org/governance-policies (last visited Mar. 23, 2016).
170 Worker Participation & Training, ACCORD ON FIRE & BUILDING SAFETY BANGLADESH,
http://bangladeshaccord.org/worker-participation-training (last visited Oct. 31, 2015).
171 BANGLADESH ACCORD SECRETARIAT, supra note 166.
172 See BANGLADESH ACCORD REGULATIONS, supra note 168.

WHITNEY.37.4.7 (Do Not Delete)

4/3/2016 1:53 PM

2016] EMPLOYER-LABOR ORGANIZATION COOPERATION
B.

1487

Examples from Within NLRA Coverage

While workers outside of the NLRA’s purview have experimented
with alternative forms of worker organizations and company
collaborations, so too have workers within its coverage. But for them,
looking for alternative methods of collective action has taken place
under the NLRA’s shadow. Below are two examples of the results. In
both, traditional unions have been an ill-fit, but for different reasons.
The first example involves employees within a franchise system: fast
food workers. The second involves workers at Google, where workers
often align with the company (as Googlers) and the company has
created a culture where at least some workers look to exercise a voice
from within, with employer involvement in that process welcome.
1.

Industry-Wide Organizations

As described in Part I, franchise relationships make traditional
unionization difficult and ineffective. But those challenges
notwithstanding, fast food workers remain in difficult circumstances. 173
As a result, they have looked for alternative means of collective voice.
Fast Food Forward is one example. 174
Fast Food Forward has been described as a “campaign,” “a
movement,” and its work as “part of a broader political project.” 175 Its
primary goal is an industry-wide raise to fifteen dollars an hour. It has
also targeted unsafe working conditions, calling for the Department of
Labor to investigate. 176 November 29, 2012 marked its first public act—a
173 One study found that fifty-two percent of the families of front-line fast-food workers are
enrolled in one or more public assistance programs (compared to twenty-five percent of the
workforce overall), which comes out to nearly seven billion dollars a year in public assistance
directly to families of fast-food workers. See SYLVIA ALLEGRETTO ET AL., U.C. BERKELEY CTR.
FOR LABOR RESEARCH & EDUC., FAST FOOD, POVERTY WAGES: THE PUBLIC COST OF LOWWAGE JOBS IN THE FAST-FOOD INDUSTRY 1 (2013), http://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/pdf/2013/
fast_food_poverty_wages.pdf.
174 This movement is also known as “Fight for $15.”
175 Crain & Inazu, supra note 42; Jordan Weissmann, The Fast-Food Strikes Have Been a
Stunning Success for Organized Labor, SLATE (Sept. 7, 2014, 8:00 PM), http://www.slate.com/
blogs/moneybox/2014/09/07/the_fast_food_strikes_a_stunning_success_for_organized_
labor.html; see also Latest from the Campaign, FAST FOOD FORWARD, http://
fastfoodforward.org (last visited Feb. 7, 2016); William Finnegan, Dignity: Fast-Food Workers
and a New Form of Labor Activism, NEW YORKER (Sept. 15, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/
magazine/2014/09/15/dignity-4.
176 A petition to the Department of Labor called for an investigation into unsafe work
conditions and improper treatment of injuries, particularly burns. Third-Degree Burn.
McDonald’s “treatment”? MUSTARD, FIGHT FOR $15, http://fightfor15.org/petition/burns (last
visited Mar. 23, 2016).
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one-day strike of about two hundred workers from around forty fast
food restaurants in New York City. 177 In December of 2013, workers in
over a hundred cities coordinated one-day walkouts. 178 On Labor Day
2014, President Obama endorsed the campaign in a speech and a few
weeks later workers in 150 cities took action with sit-ins. 179
Since Fast Food Forward started, minimum wage increases have
been seen across the country, with minimum wage increases winning on
the November 2014 ballot in even red states. 180 But while the
organization has done much to push minimum wage increases, its
interest in dealing directly with fast food restaurants continues
unabated. In an August 30 interview, the organization’s chief
strategist—an organizing director from the SEIU—explained that if
McDonald’s refuses to hold talks with the movement’s leaders, the
company would face more protests across the United States and
increased efforts to get governments around the world to take action
against it. 181 And more specifically, the organization’s strategist
explained that in those talks the organization would press McDonald’s
to lift wages for both company-owned and franchise restaurant workers,
in addition to other things. 182
But while Fast Food Forward has organized workers for collective
action, received tens of millions of dollars in funding from the Service
Employees International Union (SEIU), and has even described what it
is doing as a form of “collective bargaining” and itself as a “union,” 183 if
it is a “labor organization” under the NLRA or else some of its most

Finnegan, supra note 175.
See id.; Steven Greenhouse, Fast-Food Workers Seeking $15 Wage Are Planning Civil
Disobedience, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/02/business/fastfood-workers-seeking-higher-wages-plan-another-strike.html.
179 See Finnegan, supra note 175.
180 See Peter Coy, Why Red States Voted Blue on the Minimum Wage, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 5,
2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-11-05/why-red-states-voted-to-raise-theminimum-wage; see also Weissmann, supra note 175. Weissmann also points out that Google
searches for “minimum wage” have steadily increased since 2013. While tying these successes
directly to Fast Food Forward’s efforts is difficult, in cities like Seattle, where it focused early
efforts, there is evidence of politicians supporting a higher minimum wage and explicitly
invoking Fast Food Forward. See id.
181 Greenhouse, Fight for $15, supra note 38.
182 Id.
183 Id. (“‘I would call what happened [in New York] collective bargaining, and I would call
that a union,’ [Fight for $15’s chief strategist] said, even though there was no ‘bargaining’ with
employers.”). Identifying these tactics as those of a union is perhaps not surprising. Since the
early 1900s unions have supported the Democratic Party as a means of achieving gains through
politics. See JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE COMPANY: A SHORT HISTORY
OF A REVOLUTIONARY IDEA 73 (2005). One-day strikes also have a place in labor’s history. See
id.
177
178
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effective economic-based tactics would be restricted. 184 And, if it is a
labor organization, it cannot legally sit down with employers and
negotiate conditions to end particular strikes (e.g., a wage increase) until
it has been chosen by the relevant workers as their bargaining
representative through an election or other type procedure, nor
negotiate new safety procedures and training, its comments that it
demands the same notwithstanding. 185 But here note the contrast
between the limits placed on Fast Food Forward’s ability to go to the
bargaining table with McDonald’s and those on the Immokalee
Worker’s Fair Food Program. As discussed previously, because the Fair
Food Program currently helps workers in Florida who are not covered
by the NLRA, section 8(a)(2) and 302 problems are avoided because it is
not a “labor organization.” The Immokalee Workers can directly sit
down with companies to create agreements that result in increased pay
and benefits for workers. But, in a world of low-wage service jobs and
franchisee relationships, the power available to the Immokalee Workers
may be just as beneficial for fast food workers as they are for agricultural
ones.
Another example of an industry-wide nontraditional worker
organization is provided by the Restaurant Opportunities Centers
United (ROC), an organization comprised of “13,000 restaurant
workers, 100 high-road employers, [and] thousands of engaged
consumers united for raising restaurant industry standards.” 186 The
organization was founded with support from a union, HERE Local 100,
as a relief center for restaurant workers affected by 9/11. 187 The
organization states that it has a “tri-pronged” strategy: (1) organizing
workplace campaigns that “demonstrate public consequences for
employers who take the ‘low-road’ to profitability” (i.e. protests,
boycotts, etc.); (2) “promoting the high road to profitability through
partnerships with responsible restaurateurs, cooperative restaurant
development, and a workforce development program that moves lowincome workers into living wage jobs; and (3) research and policy
work.” 188 The organization has had notable successes while avoiding
184 Extended picketing and secondary boycotts are two examples. See NLRA § 8(b)(4), 29
U.S.C. §§ 158(b)(4), (b)(7) (2012).
185 See infra Part III for an explanation of these restrictions.
186 About Us, RESTAURANT OPPORTUNITIES CENTERS UNITED, http://rocunited.org/about-us
(last visited Jan. 5, 2016); see also Caroline Lange, High Road Restaurant Week Urges Diners to
Consider Who’s in the Kitchen in Addition to What’s on the Plate, EDIBLE MANHATTAN (Mar.
27, 2014), http://www.ediblemanhattan.com/foodshed-2/people-foodshed-2/local-heroes/highroad-restaurant-week-urges-diners-consider-whos-kitchen-addition-whats-plate.
187 See Eli Naduris-Weissman, The Worker Center Movement and Traditional Labor Law: A
Contextual Analysis, 30 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 232, 252 (2009).
188 Our Work, supra note 40. This method has historical roots. See CHARLES J. MORRIS, THE
BLUE EAGLE AT WORK: RECLAIMING DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE
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labor organization classification. One common sequence of events
begins with an employee coming in to complain about an employer’s
unlawful treatment (e.g., failure to pay overtime). The organization then
creates a campaign to pressure the employer to improve overall
conditions and rectify the discrete issue the complaining employee
raised through tactics that include threatening to file lawsuits against the
employer for its unlawful activity. In order to settle the lawsuit, ROC
requires the restaurant to sit down and work out a long-term agreement
that looks remarkably similar to a normal collective bargaining
agreement. 189
This strategy was used effectively to fight purported discrimination
against Hispanic and Bangladeshi employees who applied for positions
as waiters at the famous New York restaurant, Daniel. 190 The
organization began with demonstrations outside the restaurant with a
twelve-foot-tall inflatable cockroach and eventually entered into a
confidential settlement with Daniel owner and famous chef, Daniel
Boulud. 191 A similar strategy also worked against a Mario Batali
restaurant, with a final settlement that required the restaurant to pay
$1.15 million in misappropriated tips and unpaid overtime. 192 It also
required new policies for paid sick days and promotions. 193 But while
these settlements look like forms of collective bargaining agreements,
the organization states they are not, but instead, settlements of
lawsuits. 194
ROC is distinguishable from Fast Food Forward with regards to the
second prong of its strategy—its partnerships with “good” employers. In
particular, ROC not only has “high road” employers as members (to
join, the restaurant fills out an application indicating whether it
provides its workers things like paid sick days, seven dollars or more an
hour for the lowest paid employees who earn tips and ten dollars or

(2005) (discussing the Blue Eagle “Codes of Fair Competition” created under section 7(a) of the
National Industrial Relations Act. Under the Blue Eagle program, businesses that supported the
National Recovery Administration and created such codes of fair competition were permitted
to place the Blue Eagle symbol on their goods and in their stores. While voluntary, the seal was
popular with consumers and workers).
189 See Naduris-Weissman, supra note 187, at 254 (“The expansive nature of the gains
achieved in these agreements is the product of ROC-NY’s collaborative process: the center
works with complaining employees to develop a list of workplace changes and then brings these
demands to the bargaining table after initial pressure campaigns against the employer.”).
190 See Steven Greenhouse, Advocates for Workers Raise the Ire of Business, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
17, 2014, at B1.
191 See id.
192 See id.
193 See id.
194 See id.
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more an hour for the lowest non-tipped employees), 195 but also
promotes those restaurant-members through its annual dining guide,
where it lists New York restaurants and gives them a thumbs up or
down depending on how they treat their employers (e.g., whether the
restaurant gives paid sick days). 196 It also runs a “High Road Restaurant
Week.” 197 While the below involves fictitious names, it illustrates the
organization’s partnerships with employers but applied in the Fast Food
Forward context. If ROC or Fast Food Forward are labor organizations,
this strategy will be prohibited.
Imagine a McDonald’s competitor, Better Burger (BB),
sympathizes with Fast Food Forward’s goals. BB’s mission is to provide
fast food while paying workers and suppliers well. Indeed, BB already
pays its workers fifteen dollars an hour. Suppose that at a recent
meeting, a BB employee told BB that the workers were getting behind
the Fast Food Forward Movement. BB is not surprised. In fact, a light
goes off: BB is an example of what the Movement is trying to create
throughout the fast food industry. The Movement might benefit from
promoting BB as a viable alternative for ethically-minded consumers
looking for burgers and fries, perhaps through a “Fast Food Forward
Approved Restaurant” campaign. And of course BB would benefit from
increased publicity and sales. To that end, BB contacts Fast Food
Forward, recommends the relationship, and agrees to donate the funds
the Movement needs to get such a “Fast Food Forward Approved
Restaurant” program off the ground.
A partnership between BB and Fast Food Forward appears
mutually beneficial: the company gets positive press and a type of
accreditation that marks it as being the sort of do-good company it tries
to be; 198 its own workers have the psychic benefit of knowing their
employer is meaningfully committed to the do-good aims it espouses,
and Fast Food Forward gains both financial support and a credibility
boost to the extent the BB brand is well established and something
consumers positively perceive.

195 See Restaurants Advancing Industry Standards in Employment (RAISE) Membership
Form, RESTAURANT OPPORTUNITIES CENTERS UNITED, http://rocunited.org/raise-applicationform (last visited Mar. 23, 2016).
196 See id.
197 About Us, supra note 186; see also Lange, supra note 186.
198 For companies like BB that face a market for lemons problem, partnering with an outside
organization that can verify and certify its practices is a recognized strategy. See Easterbrook &
Fischel, supra note 127, at 674.
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Intra-Company Organizations

Collective voice vehicles and the desire to improve the terms and
conditions of work are not the sole province of low-wage workers.
However, a number of factors make it the case that the forms of
collective action higher-powered workers use will often differ from both
traditional unions and the political-based organizing strategies of fast
food workers. As Part II briefly explored, like the welfare capitalists of
the 1920s, companies with an in-demand workforce are motivated to
treat its workers well and earn their trust and loyalty. 199 Employee
bonding encourages creativity, cooperation, and retention. 200 But the
more employees identify with the company, the less likely they will
identify with an outside union. Yet, because these workers are indemand, companies will often want to create or support conditions in
which workers feel comfortable voicing concerns instead of quitting.
Google is one example. From the outset, it made clear that its focus
was on innovating and its mission, “to organize the world’s information
and make it universally accessible.” 201 To do this, Google hires top talent
and strives to create an environment where that talent can thrive. 202 Its
Google Careers page sheds light on these efforts. One headline reads,
“creating an office for work and play,” and explains “we aim to make
our offices a place that Googlers want to be” as “data shows that these
spaces have a positive impact on productivity, collaboration and

199 Welfare capitalism is the term used to describe the ethos that emerged in the 1920s that
companies could “do well by doing good for employees.” See DUBOFSKY & DULLES, supra note
67.
200 Cynthia Estlund has extensively discussed the non-economic benefits workers can and
should get from the workplace. See, e.g., CYNTHIA ESTLUND, WORKING TOGETHER: HOW
WORKPLACE BONDS STRENGTHEN A DIVERSE DEMOCRACY 7 (2003); Cynthia Estlund, Who
Mops the Floors at the Fortune 500? Corporate Self-Regulation and the Low-Wage Workplace, 12
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 671, 674 (2008). It is a natural extension of her work to suggest that the
more these benefits are realized at a particular workplace, the more likely workers will seek out
voice mechanisms instead of exit strategies.
201 Company Overview, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/about/company (last visited Jan.
19, 2016).
202 I do not mean to suggest that all people who, speaking colloquially again, “work for”
Google enjoy these benefits, as the recent unionization efforts by Silicon Valley shuttle drivers
shows. See Kristen V. Brown, For Google Shuttle Drivers, It’s a Grueling Ride, SFGATE (Sept. 28,
2014, 6:54 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/For-Google-shuttle-drivers-it-s-agrueling-ride-5785556.php; Steven Greenhouse, Facebook’s Shuttle Bus Drivers Seek to
Unionize, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/06/business/facebooksbus-drivers-seek-union.html?_r=1; Tyrone Richardson, Facebook Shuttle Bus Drivers in
California Unanimously Ratify Their First Labor Contract, BNA DAILY LAB. REP. (Feb. 23,
2015).
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inspiration.” 203 Visitors also see an interview where co-founder Larry
Page said, “[m]y job as a leader is to make sure everybody in the
company has great opportunities, and that they feel they’re having a
meaningful impact and are contributing to the good of society.”204
Asked more about the employee experience Google is trying to design,
he said,
[i]t’s important that the company be a family, that people feel that
they’re part of the company, and that the company is like a family to
them. When you treat people that way, you get better productivity.
Rather than really caring what hours you worked, you care about
output. We should continue to innovate in our relationship with our
employees and figure out the best things we can do for them. 205

“Employee resource groups” are an example of the collective voice
organizations that exist within Google. 206 The Gayglers, Google’s LGBT
group, is one example. Structurally, the group has both local chapters
that put on and support local events and a larger Gaygler Steering
Committee. 207 The group has a say on Google policies. 208 Google also
supports the group in a variety of other ways: from letting the group use
its in-house studio to create and distribute an It Gets Better Project
video to supporting internal Gayglers events and providing funding for
Gayglers to buy tables at LGBT fundraisers. 209
In the case of the Gayglers, it makes sense that the company has an
interest in funding the organization and working with it when
developing both recruiting initiatives and internal policies surrounding
workplace harassment and discrimination. The workers, too, seem to
benefit. The organization itself is international, thereby allowing for a
system of support for a specific set of workplace issues that might
203 See Creating an Office for Work and Play, GOOGLE CAREERS, http://www.google.com/
about/careers/lifeatgoogle/creating-an-office-for-work-and-play.html (last visited Mar. 23,
2016).
204 Adam Lashinsky, Larry Page: Google Should Be like a Family, FORTUNE (Jan. 19, 2012,
12:00 PM), http://fortune.com/2012/01/19/larry-page-google-should-be-like-a-family.
205 Id.
206 Foster a Fair and Inclusive Google, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/diversity/atgoogle.html#tab=black-googler-network.
207 See Kevin Burns, Interview with Shwetha Pai, Gaygler, Google, LGBT INCLUSIVE
WORKPLACES, http://www.lgbtinclusiveasia.org/2013/03/461/3 (last visited Mar. 23, 2016)
(discussing Gaygler experiences in India); see also Bryan Moore, Inside Talk: Gay at Google,
FOURTWONINE (Jan. 29, 2015), http://dot429.com/articles/401-insider-talk-being-gay-atgoogle.
208 Google states on its site that “[t]he Gayglers not only lead the way in celebrating Pride
around the world, but also inform programs and policies.” See Foster a Fair and Inclusive
Google, supra note 206.
209 Ludwik Trammer, Talking Gayglers with Google’s Bennet Marks, GOOGLE: BLOGOSCOPED
(June 18, 2007), http://blogoscoped.com/archive/2007-06-18-n44.html; see also Moore, supra
note 207.
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otherwise be overlooked in smaller foreign offices, which often have less
legal protection for LGBT workers. 210 Members, it is reasonable to
assume, are also best equipped to speak to the conditions on the ground
and know what sorts of training and processes might make the
workplace better for its members. That the company recognizes the
Gayglers comparative advantage and seeks to harness it when crafting
workplace harassment and discrimination policies makes sense for the
company and Gayglers alike. The problem, however, is that labor law
casts a shadow of uncertainty over the legality of at least some versions
of this collaboration. While marginal players like Google may be willing
to take the risk, the vast majority of companies may not.
III. “LABOR ORGANIZATIONS” AND THE BAN ON COMPANY SUPPORT
The above examples are designed to highlight some of the
important work company-worker partnerships and joint organizations
can and already are doing for workers. For workers the NLRA does not
cover, we see robust and highly effective organizations like the Fair Food
Council that challenge the orthodox view that company support of
worker organizations is merely a union-avoidance technique. 211 Supply
chains and franchise arrangements call for different sorts of
organizational strategies. For instance, larger trade association-like
organizations where workers and reputation-conscious companies come
together to set standards—a strategy workers within NLRA coverage
may find worth exploring more in the future. Other, often more
powerful workers like those discussed at Google, have found it in their
interest to organize internally through affiliation groups that receive
company funding and support. 212 Yet when these affiliation groups are
open to all workers, including managers, and companies reach out and
discuss relevant policies with those organizations, section 8(a)(2) of the
NLRA and 302 of the LMRA loom large. 213
In this Part, I explain in more detail the ways in which labor law
limits these various forms of collaboration. And, in so doing, at least
some ways organizations may avoid NLRA coverage entirely (by failing
to be a “labor organization”) or, though covered, avoid violating the
relevant bans on company support. As Fast Food Forward has shown,
while avoiding the ban is possible in some cases, it is not without costs—
costs that call for a rethinking of the bans.
210
211
212
213

See Moore, supra note 207.
See supra Section II.A.
See supra Section II.B.2.
See infra Section III.A.

WHITNEY.37.4.7 (Do Not Delete)

4/3/2016 1:53 PM

2016] EMPLOYER-LABOR ORGANIZATION COOPERATION

1495

“Labor Organization”

A.

“Labor organization” is defined broadly as “any organization of any
kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or plan, in
which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole
or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor
disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of
work.” 214 The definition is intentionally broad; Congress wanted to
cover “all organizations of employees that deal with employers.” 215
When determining whether a specific organization counts as a
labor organization, Board and court analysis focuses on three
interpretative thickets: (1) who is an employee, and what (2) “employee
participation” and (3) “dealing with” amount to.
1.

Employee Status

To be an employee under the NLRA, an individual must first
satisfy the common law agency test for employee status. 216 Independent
contractors, as a result, are exempt from coverage while undocumented
workers who meet the agency test are included. 217 After the common
law test is met, the NLRA makes further express exclusions. 218 The
excluded include: agricultural laborers, domestic workers employed by a
family or person at his home, those employed by their parents or
spouse, and any person employed as a supervisor or subject to the
Railway Labor Act. 219 Public sector employees are also excluded.220
Thus, an organization consisting solely of managers, agricultural
workers, or independent contractors is not a “labor organization” under
the Act and the ban on company support will not apply. 221
Given talk that we are moving toward a “gig economy,” 222 where a
sizable portion of the American workforce will be classified as
independent contractors, this might seem like good news for future
29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (2012).
See Hearing on S. 1958 Before the S. Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 74th Cong. 1 (1935).
216 See NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254, 256 (1968).
217 See Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 892 (1984).
218 29 U.S.C. § 152(3).
219 See id.
220 The NLRA does not cover federal, state, and local governments as employers. See 29
U.S.C. § 152(2).
221 See, e.g., Int’l Org. of Masters, Mates & Pilots of Am. v. NLRB, 351 F.2d 771, 775 (D.C.
Cir. 1965); Di Giorgio Fruit Corp. v. NLRB, 191 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
222 See, e.g., Arun Sundararajan, The ‘Gig Economy’ Is Coming. What Will it Mean for Work?,
GUARDIAN (July 15, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jul/26/will-weget-by-gig-economy.
214
215
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worker-company partnerships. At least for those workers, the thought
goes, workers and companies can create whatever sorts of collaborative
organizations they see fit. But even putting aside the antitrust problems
such organizations would face, 223 the imagined organizations are likely
to remain under the shadow of the NLRA.
Worker misclassification cases are front and center in the news
today, and an organization that helps only independent contractors
today may discover after litigation that it helps both independent
contractors and employees. In June 2015, an officer for the California
Labor Commissioner ruled that one Uber driver was an employee.224
There will likely be many more employee misclassification cases as the
“on demand” economy continues—and, indeed, some companies in this
sector have already converted large parts of their independent
contractor-dominated workforce into employees. 225
This uncertainty is not unique to the likes of Uber. FedEx recently
settled a number of class action lawsuits brought by drivers who argued
that they were misclassified, and when given the chance, courts have
agreed. 226 As a result, the worker organizations that are forming to help
putative independent contractors must remain aware of the possibility
that these workers’ status may change and that those changes will have
legal ramifications for the scope of permissible corporate collaboration.
Relatedly, while labor organization designation requires employee
participation, it need not be the case that only employees participate. 227
Thus, if Uber drivers are employees but Lyft drivers are not, an
organization that caters to both still satisfies the employee participation
requirement and, thus, may be a labor organization.

223 While Norris-LaGuardia and the Clayton Act expressly make antitrust laws inapplicable
to labor organizations and labor groups, the Court has held that does not include an
organization of independent contractors. See 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2012); H.A. Artists & Assocs. v.
Actors’ Equity Ass’n, 451 U.S. 704 (1981); United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
224 See Order, Barbara Ann Berwick v. Uber Technologies, Inc., Case No. 11-46739, Labor
Commissioner of the State of California (June 3, 2015).
225 See Brad Stone, Instacart Reclassifies Part of Its Workforce amid Regulatory Pressure on
Uber, BLOOMBERG (June 22, 2015, 3:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201506-22/instacart-reclassifies-part-of-its-workforce-amid-regulatory-pressure-on-uber.
226 See Peter Fimrite, FedEx Agrees to Pay $227 Million to Short-Changed Workers, SFGATE
(June 12, 2015, 6:47 PM), http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/FedEx-agrees-to-pay-227million-to-short-changed-6324745.php; see also Craig v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 335
P.3d 66 (Kan. 2014).
227 See Int’l Org. of Masters, Mates & Pilots of Am. v. NLRB, 351 F.2d 771, 776 (D.C. Cir.
1965) (finding organization comprised of both employees and non-employees a “labor
organization”), enforcing 146 N.L.R.B. 116 (1964); NLRB v. Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co., 169 F.2d
571, 576 (6th Cir. 1948) (“Although the definition requires that employees participate in the
organization in order to make it a labor organization, it does not require that the organization
be composed exclusively of employees.”).
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Employee Participation

The participation requirement has not been a source of significant
dispute up to this point, as the standard for participation has been low.
Employees need not be members of the organization to “participate” in
it. 228 For instance, returning to Fast Food Forward, the movement is
financially supported, in part, by the SEIU. Even if we assume there are
no employees participating in the day-to-day activities of Fast Food
Forward (and there are), union leaders are, and the Board has held that
that is sufficient to meet the participation requirement. 229
3.

“Dealing with” the Employer

A difficult issue going forward will likely be whether the
organization is “dealing with” an employer. The Board’s “dealing with”
jurisprudence is inconsistent, making it difficult to predict how it will be
applied to different forms of worker organizations and workercorporate partnership organizations.
At base, the Supreme Court held that “dealing” encompasses more
than just the negotiation of a collective bargaining agreement. 230 Making
recommendations to the employer where the final decision is left up to
the employer, for example, still involves dealing though it does not
involve collective bargaining. 231 The Board provided additional
guidance in the wake of that decision, defining “dealing” with as a
“bilateral mechanism between two parties” that “ordinarily entails a
pattern or practice in which a group of employees, over time, makes
proposals to management, management responds to these proposals by
acceptance or rejection by word or deed, and compromise is not
required.”232 However, even the Board’s meatier definition has been
inconsistently interpreted.
The Board’s “pattern or practice” requirement has already been of
some use to nontraditional worker organizations looking to avoid labor
organization designation. For instance, in an advice memorandum
discussing whether Restaurant Opportunities Center United was a labor
228 See, e.g., NLRB v. Metallic Bldg. Co., 204 F.2d 826, 827 n.2 (5th Cir. 1953) (holding that a
trade council, to which no individual union member belonged, but which was composed of
affiliated unions, where each sent a delegate, was a “labor organization”).
229 See id.
230 See NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203, 211–12 (1959).
231 See id. at 205, 208 (describing an employer-created committee allowing employees to
discuss “ideas and problems of mutual interest” with management, where management was free
to accept or reject the proposals, were labor organizations).
232 E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893, 894 (1993).
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organization, the General Counsel concluded that it was not one
because while the organization was picketing in front of Daniel, a
restaurant, in order to pressure the employer to engage in settlement
negotiations concerning ongoing litigation regarding its treatment of
workers could “arguably be considered ‘dealing’” under section 2(5),
there was no evidence that this conduct constituted a pattern or practice
of dealing over time. 233 However, as these organizations continue using
these strategies on an ongoing basis, such a requirement seems met.
What counts as a bilateral mechanism is another issue. One-way
mechanisms, like brainstorming sessions and organizations that merely
facilitate passive information sharing do not count. 234 In contrast, when
organizations have been designed to discuss the terms and conditions of
work and make proposals to and receive responses from
management, 235 or deal with employee grievances236 (i.e., more robust
activities of the sort the Fair Food Council and other worker-company
partnerships engage in), a bilateral mechanism was found. The Board
has also found bilateralism satisfied when the practice at issue involved
only employees making general recommendations concerning the terms
and conditions of work. 237 As for when there is or is not a pattern or
practice is another issue. Isolated and ad hoc proposals will not count
and a limited number of meetings is also okay, though how many
meetings is too many, nobody knows. 238 More recently the Board has
found the pattern or practice condition satisfied when there was no
pattern or practice yet, but the group was established for that purpose

233 Memorandum from Barry J. Kearney, Assoc. Gen. Counsel Div. to Celeste Mattina, Reg’l
Dir. Region 2 (Nov. 30, 2006). The General Counsel hedged further, however, by stating that
even if ROC were a labor organization, the complained-of activity did not violate the NLRA.
See id.
234 See, e.g., Miller Indus. Towing Equip., Inc., 342 N.L.R.B. 1074, 1089 (2004); E. I. du Pont
de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. at 894.
235 See E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. at 894.
236 See Polaroid Corp., 329 N.L.R.B. 424, 445 (1999).
237 See NLRB v. Peninsula Gen. Hosp. Med. Ctr., 36 F.3d 1262, 1272–74 (4th Cir. 1994),
denying enforcement of, 312 N.L.R.B. 582 (1993) (finding no pattern or practice because the
proposals came up in isolated incidents); see also Note, Labor-Management Cooperation After
Electromation: Implications for Workplace Diversity, 107 HARV. L. REV. 678, 685 (1994) (“The
NLRB has interpreted Cabot Carbon to bring almost all employee groups within the realm of
section 2(5), with the exception of programs that include all of a company’s employees and
programs that constitute total delegations of traditional management functions to a group of
employees.” (footnote omitted)).
238 E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. at 894 (finding that “isolated instances”
where a group makes “ad hoc proposals to management” do not entail dealing); Peninsula Gen.
Hospital Med. Ctr., 36 F.3d at 1274 (refusing to enforce Board order because the committee
only met on a limited number of times and thus did not “constitute a ‘pattern or practice’ so as
to fall within the Board’s ‘bilateral mechanism’ analysis”).
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and the employer intended to hold meetings of the team in the future in
order to learn about the group’s views on issues such as pay. 239
One exception to labor organization classification occurs when the
organization is delegated managerial authority. In such cases, the
employer is simply dealing with managers. 240 Unsurprisingly, the
Board’s threshold for finding delegation has changed across Boards.
Originally, the employer had to “flatly delegate” managerial authority. 241
Later, however, the Board dramatically softened its view and found
purported labor organizations to be managerial when there was less
than flat delegation. 242 As the Board said, worker organizations
delegated “managerial authority such that the committees function as
part of management with the power to implement solutions within
certain parameters,” can count. 243 The organization need not even have
final or absolute authority. 244 However, if “the [company] and the
Committee [go] back and forth explaining themselves until an
acceptable result was achieved” the Board the managerial exception will
not apply. 245
The managerial exception could, depending on how the Board
interprets it in the future, make room for at least some types of workercompany partnerships. If the Gayglers or another company-sponsored
affiliation group like it were given a domain in which it could make
decisions (e.g., which community events to sponsor, which workers get
a day paid off to march, what sexual orientation training looks like, etc.),
a sympathetic judge could find that organization was delegated
managerial authority such that there was no dealing between the
organization and the employer. That said, there are at least two
unresolved issues for these organizations.
First, finding a delegation of managerial authority does not insulate
the organization against labor organization designation: if the group
also met with or engaged in an ongoing dialogue with management on a
See Danite Holdings, Ltd., 356 N.L.R.B. 124, 10 (2011).
See Crown Cork & Seal Co., 334 N.L.R.B. 699 (2001); Gen. Foods Corp., 231 N.L.R.B.
1232, 1235 (1977).
241 See Gen. Foods Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. at 1235; Mercy-Mem’l Hosp. Corp., 231 N.L.R.B.
1108, 1121 (1977).
242 See Crown Cork & Seal Co., 334 N.L.R.B. at 699. For scholars noting the significance of
the shift, see Joseph D. Richardson, Comment, In Name Only: Employee Participation Programs
and Delegated Managerial Authority After Crown Cork & Seal, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 871, 872
(2010), and Gerald L. Pauling II & M. Andrew McGuire, The Implications of Crown Cork &
Seal Co. for Employee Involvement Committees as Labor Organizations Under the NLRA: What
Constitutes “Dealing with” Pursuant to Section 2(5) of the Act Since Electromation, Inc.?, 18
LAB. LAW. 215 (2002).
243 Stabilus, Inc., 355 N.L.R.B. 836, 881 (2010).
244 See Crown Cork & Seal Co., 334 N.L.R.B. 699.
245 See Keeler Brass Auto. Grp., 317 N.L.R.B. 1110, 1114 (1995).
239
240
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regular basis to discuss and propose workplace policies, those types of
interactions look like bilateral mechanisms. And second, while the
managerial exception means there is no dealing between the
organization and employer, there may be dealing between employees
and the company within the organization itself. For instance, if there are
managers as group members. 246 But nonetheless, the managerial
exception does provide some cover for at least some organizations.
Putting the managerial exception aside, the ability of the discussed
organizations to work around a finding of dealing will vary. Start with
the Fair Food Council. There we have an organization that both
develops and then monitors compliance with standards for worker
treatment. The organization also negotiates with brand name
companies, like Whole Foods, in the hopes of getting that end-ofsupply-chain company to require its suppliers to abide by those agreedto standards as a matter of contract. In this case, it is hard to get around
dealing. Within the Fair Food Council itself there may be negotiation
between representatives of workers, companies, and outside non-profits
over the standards. Then, there is likely a back-and-forth between the
organization and companies over whether the company will require
supplier compliance and whether the company will help fund the
Council itself, as Fresh Market did. 247
For other organizations, dealing may be less of an issue. In the case
of Groove, we can imagine a situation where the organization makes no
arrangements with companies like Uber or taxi medallion owners at all.
It is merely an organization that provides drivers with benefits, if they
pay for membership. In such a case, dealing is avoided, but at some cost.
Thinking of Fast Food Forward, the organization may be able to more
generally protest and promote boycotts in the hopes that such actions
will indirectly result in companies providing additional goods for their
workers but the organization is unable to, even if successful, then sit
down and discuss what sort of increases the organization demands in
order to stop its economic pressure. However, sitting down with
McDonald’s is precisely what it is now calling for. 248
a. An Uncertain Representational Requirement for “Dealing”
If an organization had to stand in a representational capacity vis-àvis employees, some of the more innovative forms of worker
organization and collaboration described in Part II would avoid NLRA
coverage. As discussed, Fast Food Forward represents workers through

246
247
248

See Crown Cork & Seal Co., 334 N.L.R.B. at 701 n.2.
See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
See Steven Greenhouse, Fight for $15, supra note 38.
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political and consumer-based activity but does not “represent” them in
any direct negotiations with employers. This question of whether
dealing is representational activity is open. 249 Section 2(5) does not
expressly require a representational component, it reaches “any
organization of any kind” that deals with employers over the covered
topics, but the Board’s stance on the issue has shifted over time. 250
In earlier decisions a representational capacity was required while
in more recent decisions the Board has reversed course, suggesting the
issue remains unsettled. 251 Nonetheless, the earlier decision deals
expressly with the classification of nontraditional worker organizations
and as such provides a useful framework. 252 There, the Board was
confronted with the Center for United Labor Action (CULA). The
CULA was an organization with the general aim of assisting minorities,
women, consumers, and workers in their struggles against adverse
organizations. In the employment context, that meant the organization
supported employee protests, joined and supported strikes through
picketing and leafleting, and engaged in fundraising on behalf of
strikes. 253 The group had no formal membership. 254
The Administrative Law Judge held that while CULA did
technically “deal with employers” within the meaning of the Act,
because the purpose of the Act was to provide a procedure for employees
to choose representatives who deal with their employer and protect
them in that choice, “deal with” should be read with a further
representational requirement. 255 Because CULA was not in a
representational relationship with the workers it supported, it was not a
labor organization under the Act. 256
In a 2-1 decision the Board agreed with the ALJ’s conclusion that
CULA was not a labor organization but rejected the ALJ’s “dealing with”
249 See Samuel Estreicher, Employee Involvement and the “Company Union” Prohibition: The
Case for Partial Repeal of Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, 69 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 125, 144–46 (1994).
250 See 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (2012).
251 Compare Ctr. for United Labor Action, 219 N.L.R.B. 873 (1975), with Electromation,
Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990, 994 n.20 (1992) (“Because we find . . . that employee-members of the
Respondent’s Action Committees acted in a representational capacity, it is unnecessary to the
disposition of this case to determine whether an employee group could ever be found to
constitute a labor organization in the absence of a finding that it acted as a representative of the
other employees.”).
252 See James Gray Pope, Labor-Community Coalitions and Boycotts: The Old Labor Law, the
New Unionism, and the Living Constitution, 69 TEX. L. REV. 889, 944 (1991).
253 See Ctr. for United Labor Action, 219 N.L.R.B. at 873.
254 See id. at 873–74 n.2.
255 See id. at 875. Here, representational organizations are understood as “only [those]
selected and designated by employees to bargain with employers on behalf of that employer’s
employees.” Id.
255 See id. at 880.
256 See id.
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analysis. The Board held that “to qualify as a labor organization under
our Act the organization must be selected and designated by employees
for the purpose of resolving their conflicts with employers.” 257 And here,
CULA never “sought to deal directly with employers concerning
employee labor relations matters.” 258
The dissent, in contrast, thought labor organization designation
followed directly from the Board’s decision in Porto Mills. 259 In Porto
Mills, the Board adopted the ALJ’s finding that Comite Pro-Defensa de
los Trabajadores de Porto Mills was a labor organization, albeit an antiunion labor organization, under section 2(5) even though it never
sought to bargain or negotiate a contract with the employer. Instead, it
“dealt with” the employer when it demanded the discharge of an
employee who was a union organizing leader. 260 As the dissent saw it, if
Comite was a labor organization under those conditions, then CULA,
which had the purpose of picketing for reinstatement of discharged
employees, boycotting a manufacturer whose labor policies it disagreed
with, and aiding and financing employee-organizing activities, was
too. 261
Some scholars have suggested the Board’s reasoning was flawed.262
For one, the Board’s decision likely rests labor organization designation
in the hands of employers. That is, it seems plausible that CULA would
have sat down and negotiated labor matters with the employer if the
employer would have agreed to it (much like the leaders of Fast Food
Forward might like to do the same). The Board’s decision thus puts
organizations like CULA to a difficult choice: boycott freely, without
labor organization designation, or choose to sit down and negotiate with
a willing employer about precisely the thing you are boycotting and
immediately risk labor organization designation.
What role, if any, CULA will play as the Board comes to grips with
new forms of worker organizations remains unclear in light of the
Board’s most recent backtracking. Yet, the fact that the Board found
sufficient representational activity in the case in which it backtracked,
Electromation, suggests that the level of representation required, if any,
is not high. There, the Board did not suggest that the employees who
signed up to participate on action committees were speaking on behalf
Id. at 873.
Id. (emphasis added).
259 Porto Mills, Inc., 149 N.L.R.B. 1454 (1964).
260 See Ctr. for United Labor Action, 219 N.L.R.B. 873, 874–75 (1975).
261 Id. at 875.
262 See, e.g., Michael C. Duff, Alt-Labor, Secondary Boycotts, and Toward a Labor
Organization Bargain, 63 CATH. U. L. REV. 837, 862–63 (2014); David Rosenfeld, Worker
Centers: Emerging Labor Organizations—Until They Confront the National Labor Relations Act,
27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 469, 487 (2006).
257
258
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of, or representing the interests of, employees not on the committee
(i.e., that they were representatives of anybody but themselves at all).
Instead, employees self-selected for membership. 263
What all this means for whether new forms of worker
organizations or the third-party monitoring organizations they create
with employers constitute labor organizations is uncertain. While there
is some case law, the Board has simply had little occasion to build up a
coherent doctrine in this space. But given both the case law and
continual pressure from organizations like the Chamber of Commerce
for these organizations to be so classified, 264 it is a risk companies and
worker organizations have to confront when creating organizations that
can help companies keep their promises to do good for and by their
workers.
B.

Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA

Once the Board determines a particular organization is a “labor
organization,” an employer can violate section 8(a)(2) by
“dominat[ing],” “interfer[ing] with the formation or administration of,”
or “contribut[ing] financial or other support” to it. 265 These violations
are examined separately.
1.

Domination or Interference with Formation or Administration

When employer participation in a labor organization constitutes
domination or interference is tricky. Supervisors, though unprotected
by the NLRA, are not statutorily prohibited from joining labor
organizations. 266 In reality, though, supervisor membership is virtually
never upheld against a section 8(a)(2) challenge. 267 Management’s
membership in a labor organization suggests its preference for that
organization, which has been thought to impermissibly coerce
employees into joining it over other options. 268 At most, courts have
Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990, 995 (1992).
See AN OVERVIEW OF LEADING WORKER CENTERS, supra note 20.
265 29 U.S.C. § 158 (2012).
266 See id. § 164(a).
267 For instance, the Board and courts have found the presence of supervisors in labor
organizations to constitute unlawful interference even when the employer knew of but did not
authorize the supervisor to join. See Local 636 of United Ass’n of Journeymen & Apprentices of
Plumbing & Pipe Fitting Indus. of U.S. & Canada, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 287 F.2d 354, 359–60
(D.C. Cir. 1961).
268 See Stevenson Equip. Co., 174 N.L.R.B. 865 (1969) (management membership implies
favoritism, may coerce employees to vote for that union out of fear of employer retaliation).
263
264
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upheld supervisor membership against section 8(a)(2) challenges when
those supervisors were members in name only. 269
But employers need not join the labor organization in order to
interfere or dominate with its formation or administration. In virtually
every case where the employer participated in the creation of the worker
organization or maintains some control over its operations, structure, or
funding, there has been a finding of interference or domination.270
Whether or not employees want employer participation does not
determine whether that participation constitutes domination or
interference. 271 In short, once the Board has determined an organization
is a labor organization, the involvement of the employer will very likely
lead to a finding of at least interference.
2.

Financial or Other Support

Today, the question of whether an employer has “supported” a
labor organization boils down to whether the employer has crossed the
line from giving “lawful cooperation” to “unlawful support.” 272 Like all
standards, such line drawing is fraught as “the quantum of employer
cooperation which surpasses the line and becomes unlawful support is
269 See, e.g., Boyle’s Famous Corned Beef Co. v. NLRB, 400 F.2d 154, 167 (8th Cir. 1968),
denying enforcement, Boyle’s Famous Corned Beef Co., 168 N.L.R.B. 299 (1967).
270 See, e.g., E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893 (1993) (finding domination of
six employee committees though the employer only participated in the formation of one.
Employer retained power over operations, meetings, and had a veto power over committee
actions); Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990, 995–96 (1992) (finding domination when
employer announced the formation of employee committees, asked employees to voluntarily
sign up, had a member of HR sit in on the meetings, and thanked employees for their
participation).
271 See Electromation v. N.L.R.B., 35 F.3d 1148, 1168 (7th Cir. 1994) (“To focus exclusively
on employee subjective reactions in order to demonstrate a Section 8(a)(2) violation would, it
seems to us, contravene the purpose of the Act. It is entirely possible that an extremely wellconstructed employer-dominated labor organization could be so ‘camouflaged’ as to persuade
employees that it represented their best interests and preserved their free choice when in fact it
did not. After all, this type of “company union” was precisely the conduct which the Wagner
Act sought to eradicate from the workplace.”).
272 See Dana Corp., 356 N.L.R.B. No. 49, *1, *5–6 (2010). If an employer gives or offers to
give a labor organization financial support via a direct monetary contribution, the employer
will likely have violated section 8(a)(2); see also, e.g., NLRB v. Pa. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 303
U.S. 261, 268 (1938) (“The Board’s . . . findings of fact fully sustain its conclusion that
respondents had engaged in unfair labor practices, by active participation in the organization
and administration of the Employees Association, which they dominated throughout its
history, and to whose financial support they had contributed . . . .”); Dixie Bedding Mfg. Co.,
121 N.L.R.B. 189, 196 (1958), enforced Dixie Bedding Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 268 F.2d 901 (5th Cir.
1959) (finding employer violated section 8(a)(2) by both (1) paying the union initiation fees of
its employees who signed authorization cards before a specified date, and (2) providing the
union an amount that exceeded what it was legally due for those employees).
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not susceptible to precise measurement.” 273 This uncertainty is all the
more true given the Board’s fluctuating position on the line over time,
and seemingly in response to the forms of labor organization the Board
confronts. 274 Here, I discuss two areas most likely to come up for the
non-union forms of labor organizations described above: MOAs and
Letters of Agreements (LOA), and financial support.
The Board has held a Memorandum of Agreements (MOA) or
Letter of Agreement (LOA) that “set forth certain principles that would
inform future bargaining on particular topics—bargaining contingent
on a showing of majority support” did not constitute unlawful
support. 275 This even though in the LOA the parties committed “that in
no event will bargaining between the parties erode current solutions and
concepts already in place” to deal with the cost of quality healthcare for
employees, which included premium sharing and deductibles. 276 In
contrast, when LOAs between employers and labor organizations
without majority status are in essence completed collective bargaining
agreements that will go into effect if the union achieves majority status,
the Board finds unlawful support. 277
The cooperation-support line nonetheless may provide some
protection for the sorts of worker-company collaborations and
organizations discussed. For instance, the Fair Food Council and other
organizations dedicated to improving working conditions throughout
complex chains make progress on these goals by pressuring end-ofchain companies to require, as a matter of contract, their suppliers to
abide by a supplier code of conduct that, among other things, requires
that supplier to allow members from the labor organization to enter its
premise, monitor for compliance, and train the supplier’s workers.278
But these agreements between the Fair Food Council and end-of-chain
companies are themselves the result of bargaining. Unlike what is
imagined in LOA contexts, there will never be an employee vote. The
LOA between such an organization and employer is the completed
bargaining agreement. Whether the Board will see these arrangements,

273 Dana Corp., 356 N.L.R.B. at *6 (quoting Longchamps, Inc., 205 N.L.R.B. 1025, 1031
(1973)).
274 See Note, Worker Ownership and Section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act, 91
YALE L.J. 615, 620 (1982) (“Judicial interpretation of section 8(a)(2) has evolved from an initial
belief that free choice requires nearly total insulation of employee labor organizations from
management to a recognition that it permits a degree of “cooperation” between management
and workers’ organizations.”) (Note predates the Board’s decision in Electromation, where the
Board swung back to something closer to near total insulation).
275 Dana Corp., 356 N.L.R.B. at * 9.
276 Id. at *22.
277 Id. at *8–9 (discussing Majestic Weaving Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 859 (1964)).
278 See supra Section II.A.2.
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in the context of a world without labor organization elections, is difficult
to predict.
Some might argue that such an arrangement looks like the
employer is treating the organization as if it had majority status when it
does not. And, LOAs aside, recognizing minority unions before elected
has been held unlawful support. 279 That said, regardless of what the
Board does, the incentives are odd. If a fully fleshed out bargaining
agreement set out in an LOA constitutes impermissible support in cases
where the organization will eventually attempt to win majority status
but is permissible so long as the organization bypasses the election
altogether, then employees may have less voice in the organizations
purporting to represent them (since they never ratify the agreement by
vote at all). Then again, a rule that would allow industry to write its own
and supplier codes of conduct so long as those codes are written without
the input of labor organizations (with or without a vote by the affected
workers) seems to only hurt the workers themselves.
As for financial support, the answer is plain: seemingly any
financial contribution from an employer to a labor organization that
falls outside of those expressly permitted by the Act, constitute unlawful
support. 280 Given this, it is unlikely that an employer could lawfully
provide money to a labor organization as a sign of goodwill, smart
marketing, or to help the organization develop something like the Fast
Food Forward Seal of Approval or ongoing monitoring system, like the
Fair Food Council.
C.

Section 302 of the LMRA

Section 302(a)(2) of the LMRA makes it a crime for an employer
“to pay, lend, or deliver, or agree to pay, lend, or deliver any money or
other thing of value” to “any labor organization . . . which represents,
seeks to represent, or would admit to membership, any of the employees
of such employer.” 281 Section 302(a)(3) makes it a crime for an employer
to provide the same “to any employee or group or committee of
employees of such employer . . . in excess of their normal compensation
for the purpose of causing such employee or group committee directly
or indirectly to influence any other employees in the exercise of the
See Int’l Ladies Garment Workers Union v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731, 737 (1961).
See, e.g., Dixie Bedding Mfg. Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 189, 196 (1958), enforced in Dixie Bedding
Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 268 F.2d 901 (5th Cir. 1959) (finding employer violated section 8(a)(2) by
both (1) paying the union initiation fees of its employees who signed authorization cards before
a specified date, and (2) providing the union an amount that exceeded what it was legally due
for those employees).
281 29 U.S.C. § 186 (2012).
279
280
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right to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing.” 282 Violators of section 302 face up to $15,000 in
fines and five years in prison. 283
Congress passed section 302 to, in part, prevent the payment of
bribes by an employer to its employees’ representatives and extortion or
shakedowns of employers by employees’ representatives. 284 That said,
the Board and courts have found section 302 violations when employers
have not only blatantly bribed union officials but also for payments to
funds where no corruption was alleged and paid leaves of absence for
employees to work full-time for the union. 285 Indeed, courts have held
that an arbitration award requiring an employer to pay its employee’s
union the amount equal to the dues the union would have collected if
the employer had not used non-union workers violated 302 because
such payments were things of value and did not fall under potential
exceptions. 286 HR professionals are warned,
an employer who donates old equipment to the union to be used for
training purposes may be giving the union a “thing of value.” Even
providing certain items at a discount—such as tickets to a reception
at prices otherwise offered only to management—likely violates the
law, as the difference in price could be a “thing of value.” 287

In one important case for purposes of the arrangements discussed here,
the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court and held that a joint labormanagement “industry board” established by a collective bargaining
agreement with an outside union was itself a labor organization and an
employer’s payments to the joint board violated section 302, even
though there was no allegation of corruption. 288
282 Id. § 186(a)(3). There are some exceptions built into 302, for instance for dues check-offs,
but they will not be helpful here. Id. § 186(c).
283 Id. § 186(d).
284 See 93 CONG. REC. 4678 (1947) (statement of Sen. Ball); 93 CONG. REC. 4746 (1947)
(statement of Sen. Taft); S. REP. NO. 80-105, at 52 (1947); see also United States v. Ryan, 225
F.2d 417, 426 (2d Cir. 1955).
285 See, e.g., Walsh v. Schlecht, 429 U.S. 401 (1977) (holding payments by an employer to a
trust fund on behalf of employees of a subcontractor who was not a signatory to the collective
bargaining agreement violated section 302(a)(1)); Titan Tire Corp. of Freeport, Inc. v. United
Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Mfg., Energy, Allied Indus. and Serv. Workers Int’l Union,
734 F.3d 708 (7th Cir. 2013) (holding employer violated section 302 when it agreed to pay
union officials’ full-time salaries of the President and Benefit Representative of the union
representing the company’s employees). The Titan court found its holding to “further[] the
statutory purpose of preventing conflicts of interest.” Id. at 712.
286 See N.Y. Tel. Co. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am. Local 1100, AFL-CIO Dist. One, 256 F.3d
89 (2d Cir. 2001).
287 See Arthur P. Murphy & Emel G. Wadhwani, Think Twice Before You Pick Up the Lunch
Tab, 11 No. 6 HR ADVISOR: LEGAL & PRAC. GUIDANCE ART 2 (2005).
288 See Sheet Metal Contractors Ass’n of S.F. v. Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n, 248 F.2d
307 (9th Cir. 1957).
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The most recent issue, as Mulhall and the VW example both
illustrate, is whether a pre-bargaining Memorandum of Understanding
violates the ban. Put another way, do such agreements entail an
employer “deliver[ing]” or “agree[ing] to deliver” a “thing of value” to a
labor organization. The Third and Fourth Circuits have said no while
the Eleventh Circuit has said it can. 289 Again, how the Board and courts
would view agreements between employers and labor organizations
that, at least are not currently, attempting to unionize the workplace is
also unclear. What seems more straightforward is that an employer
providing money to that labor organization will almost certainly violate
section 302, yet such financial support seems crucial to the creation of
organizations that have the capacity to act as third-party monitors of
corporate practices.
IV. PARTIAL AND POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
The doctrinal discussion in Part III illustrates the section 8(a)(2)
and 302 vulnerabilities faced by nontraditional worker organizations
designed to help NLRA-covered workers. For organizations that create
general codes of conduct and then try to get reputation-conscious
companies to agree to not only abide by them but require their suppliers
to do the same, like the Fair Food Council, the only question is whether
the organization is a labor organization under section 2(5). 290 If it is,
then the combination of employer funding and employer membership
almost surely violate the relevant bans. The same can be said for
organizations like Restaurant Opportunities Centers United. For
affiliation groups within companies like Google, if the company does or
intends to work with that organization on the development of company
policies, then the company’s funding of the organization will almost
certainly also violate the bans. 291 As discussed in Part I, current
economic, doctrinal, and consumer conditions have led to the
development of these nontraditional forms of organization. And those
discussed here have enjoyed success and hold promise for workers
looking to organize for mutual advantage going forward—an express
policy of the United States. 292 Because sections 8(a)(2) and 302 have the
289 Compare Adcock v. Freightliner, 550 F.3d 369 (4th Cir. 2008) (finding such agreements
do not implicate section 302), and Hotel Emps. & Rest. Emps. Union, Local 57 v. Sage Hosp.
Res., LLC, 390 F.3d 206 (3d Cir. 2004) (same), with Mulhall v. Unite Here Local 355, 667 F.3d
1211 (11th Cir. 2012) (finding such agreements may violate section 302, depending on the
intent of the parties).
290 See supra Section II.A.2.
291 See supra Section III.A.
292 See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012).
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potential to end the sorts of relationships between workers and
employers discussed, there are reasons to rethink the bans. While fully
fleshed out solutions are beyond the scope of this Article, below I sketch
out a few ways those looking to narrow, repeal, or overturn the bans
might go about doing so.
A.

Administrative or Legislative

A partial solution is a narrowing of either the definition of labor
organization in section 2(5) or of support, interference, and things of
value in sections 8(a)(2) and 302. 293 Such narrowing could be achieved
through either congressional action or Board interpretation.
If the various forms of worker organizations discussed simply fell
outside the scope of the NLRA, sections 8(a)(2) and 302 would no
longer stand in the way of cooperation with employers. Narrowing the
definition of “labor organization” has been recommended by scholars in
the past, as a way to make room for the productivity-enhancing quality
circles favored by business in the 1990s. 294 The limits of this method are
of course tied to how the narrowing is achieved. If, as Professor Samuel
Estreicher has previously called for, the definition is limited to those
organizations that “bargain with” employers over the terms and
conditions of work, problems remain for the organizations described in
Part II. 295 Affiliation groups are, when robust, bargaining over the terms
and conditions. And larger organizations like Fast Food Forward may
benefit from being able to sit down with employers and bargain directly,
instead of being forced to stay outside the front doors picketing and
protesting (employers would surely prefer that in some cases). 296
Nonetheless, while not a full solution, a narrowed version of “labor
organization” would help. Fast Food Forward and other more political
and consumer-facing organizations like it could continue as they
currently operate. Whether Restaurant Opportunities Centers United
would avoid problems remains unclear and depends on, among other
things, whether the fact that employers and employees are both
members of the organization making standards means those parties are
“bargaining” when they create standards and codes of employer conduct
that the organization pressures restaurants to adopt. 297
See id. §§ 152(5), 158(a)(2), 186(a).
See Estreicher, supra note 249, at 150; Naduris-Weissman, supra note 187, at 287–91.
295 See Estreicher, supra note 249, at 150.
296 See Greenhouse, Fight for $15, supra note 38 (“The Fight for $15 is giving McDonald’s a
stark choice: either sit down and work together with us to find a way to lift hundreds of
thousands of low-wage McDonald’s workers or face continued economic war.”).
297 See supra notes 142–47 and accompanying text.
293
294
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Both narrowing and repealing sections 8(a)(2) directly were also
proposed by scholars in the 1990s. 298 And the Teamwork for Employees
and Managers Act (TEAM Act), which made it through both houses of
Congress but was ultimately vetoed by President Clinton, would have
done so. 299 After courts began applying section 302 to once common
labor practices, like employers granting paid leaves of absence to
employees to work full-time for their unions, a few commentators began
calling for congressional amendment. 300
As between Congress and the Board, congressional gridlock makes
congressional action seem unrealistic, particularly when organizations
like the Chamber of Commerce and the Center for Union Facts are
already fighting for the opposite—that is, they continue to argue for a
more expansive definition of labor organization as a way to impose
additional costs on worker centers and the Fast Food Forward
movement. 301 Thus, though contingent on the makeup of the Board, a
narrowed interpretation is less costly and something we have seen in
here before. After the Supreme Court’s broad interpretation of “dealing
with” in Electromation, there was substantial backlash in the business
sector and a “firestorm of protest from Republicans in Congress, led by
Newt Gingrich.” 302 The Board’s subsequent definition of “dealing” as a
bilateral mechanism was understood as an attempt to respond to the
backlash. However, a narrow interpretation by one Board does not
protect against a more expansive one under a different administration.
298 Often as part of larger packages of reforms. See, e.g., PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE
WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 225–306 (1990); Barenberg, supra
note 21, at 936–40 (discussing proposals); see also Karl E. Klare, The Labor-Management
Cooperation Debate: A Workplace Democracy Perspective, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 39, 51
(1988).
299 S. REP. NO. 104-259 (1995); see also Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law,
supra note 6, at 1612 (discussing the proposal).
300 See, e.g., Christopher J. Garofalo, Note, Section 302 of the LMRA: Make Way for the
Employee-Paid Union Representative, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 775 (2000). The Supreme Court
granted certiorari in Caterpillar, Inc. v. International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and
Agricultural Implement Workers of America to decide whether such grants of paid leave
violated section 302 but the case settled and certiorari dismissed. 523 U.S. 1015 (1998).
301 See AN OVERVIEW OF LEADING WORKER CENTERS, supra note 20, at 9 (“[T]he NLRA
defines labor organizations to include organizations that seek to deal with employers, regardless
of whether the organization seeks recognition as the certified bargaining agent of employees.
OUR Walmart has not abandoned its demands that Walmart change terms and conditions of
employment in its stores. As such, it continues to have the requisite purpose for a finding that it
is a labor organization.”); Richard Berman, The Labor Movement’s New Blood: ‘Worker Centers’
Stage Strikes with Few Actual Employees and Do an End-Run Around Federal Laws Governing
Unions, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 12, 2013, 7:13 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887
324549004579066724265410410; Ben Penn, U.S. Chamber Report Casts Worker Centers as
Means for Unions to Circumvent NLRA, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 38, at A-12 (Feb. 26, 2014).
302 Michael H. LeRoy, Employee Participation in the New Millennium: Redefining a Labor
Organization Under Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1651, 1682 (1999).
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Judicial

Beyond the Court’s narrowing the relevant statutes in the ways
described above, there are also a variety of First Amendment arguments
that could require a dramatic narrowing or sections 8(a)(2) and 302.
Labor law scholars have recognized the potential of First Amendment
arguments in other areas of labor law. 303 Here I mean to only sketch
how these arguments might look, saving a deeper look for future work.
As labor scholars know, the Court has historically ignored
significant tensions between labor law and First Amendment rights of
speech and association, treating labor law as a First Amendment “black
hole,” 304 where “labor unions receive less protection than other social
movement groups, and their speech sometimes receives less protection
than even commercial speech.” 305 However, both labor scholars and the
Supreme Court have provided new arguments that could be applied to
the ban on company support and interference with labor organizations
in section 8(a)(2) and section 302’s broad prohibition on employers
giving things of value to labor organizations. In particular, the First
Amendment protection of assembly and speech provide two avenues
worth further exploration. 306 Here I begin to sketch out how those
arguments might apply.
1.

Right of Assembly and Expressive Association

While often taking a backseat to speech, the First Amendment also
protects the right to “peaceably assemble.” As Professor Michael
303 Recent work includes: Crain & Inazu, supra note 42; Marion Crain & Ken Matheny,
Beyond Unions, Notwithstanding Labor Law, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 561 (2014); Catherine L.
Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, Political Speech and Association Rights after Knox v. SEIU, Local
1000, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1023 (2013); Benjamin I. Sachs, Unions, Corporations, and Political
Opt-Out Rights after Citizens United, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 800 (2012).
304 See James G. Pope, The Three-Systems Ladder of First Amendment Values: Two Rungs
and a Black Hole, 11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 189, 191 (1984) (“On the ladder of First
Amendment values, political speech occupies the top rung, commercial speech rests on the
rung below, and labor speech is relegated to a ‘black hole’ beneath the ladder.”). Criticizing the
Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence in the area of labor is not new. See, e.g., Archibald Cox,
Strikes, Picketing and the Constitution, 4 VAND. L. REV. 574 (1951); Crain & Inazu, supra note
42; Cynthia Estlund, Labor Picketing and Commercial Speech: Free Enterprise Values in the
Doctrine of Free Speech, 91 YALE L.J. 938 (1982); Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally
Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of Conduct, “Situation-Altering Utterances,” and the Uncharted
Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1277, 1321–22 (2005) (arguing that the Court’s treatment of
picketing in labor is inconsistent with its treatment of picketing outside that context).
305 Charlotte Garden, Citizens, United and Citizens United: The Future of Labor Speech
Rights?, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 17 (2011).
306 I limit my inquiry here, as in the paper, to private sector unionism.
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McConnell has argued and other scholars endorsed, “freedom of
assembly was understood to protect not only the assembly itself but also
the right to organize assemblies through more or less continual
associations and for those associations to select their own members by
their own criteria.” 307 Scholars have recently attempted to “re-assemble”
labor law around this right. 308 Though their work has not been directed
at allowing employers to join labor organizations as members, it is
worth exploring whether or not their arguments might support that
position nonetheless.
Scholars have used association-based arguments to argue that
classifying worker centers, one type of the nontraditional worker
organizations described above, as labor organizations is constitutionally
problematic. 309 Recognizing that such a classification would put in play
a variety of restrictions on worker centers, like peaceful picketing and
certain financial reporting and disclosure requirements, Estlund asked
“[w]hat is the justification—the constitutional justification—for
imposing the manifold restrictions of labor law on voluntary
associations of workers engaged in peaceful advocacy and organizing?
Indeed, one might ask: What justifies imposing these restrictions on
ordinary unions?” 310 As she saw it, while traditional unions are involved
in a larger regulatory quid pro quo whereby the law empowers them and
restricts them, worker centers do not exercise the special powers given
to traditional unions (e.g., they do not claim the right to compel
employers to bargain with them once majority status is achieved), and
thus, they are simply voluntary associations. 311 As such, there is no
constitutional justification for failing to provide worker centers with the
full freedoms of assembly and association other voluntary associations
receive. 312 Given this, Estlund suggests that doctrine of constitutional
avoidance alone suggests courts should construe “dealing with” in a way
that avoids classifying these organizations as labor organizations under
the NLRA. 313 But, on that view, we may also ask whether, as voluntary
307 See Michael W. McConnell, Freedom by Association Neglect of the Full Scope of the First
Amendment Diminishes Our Rights, FIRST THINGS (Aug. 2012) http://www.firstthings.com/
article/2012/08/freedom-by-association; accord Crain & Inazu, supra note 42, at 12–13 (citing
same); see also Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 573
(1995) (holding freedom of speech entails the ability of the parade to choose what other
speakers to include and exclude in its parade).
308 See Crain & Inazu, supra note 42.
309 See Cynthia Estlund, Guest Post: Worker Centers as Labor Organizations? Labor Law’s
Quid Without the Quo, ONLABOR (June 11, 2015), http://onlabor.org/2015/06/11/workercenters-as-labor-organizations-labor-laws-quid-without-the-quo.
310 Id. Others have made a similar point. See Naduris-Weissman, supra note 187, at 318.
311 Naduris-Weissman, supra note 187.
312 Id.
313 Id.
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associations, these organizations also have a right to choose who joins
their ranks, as members. While one might be tempted to say the
association does not get to have employers as members because doing so
violates sections 8(a)(2) and 302, the Court has made clear in other
contexts that expressive association rights can trump otherwise
legitimate laws. 314
2.

Free Speech

From the start, the Court has never interpreted the First
Amendment as literally prohibiting all abridgments of free speech. 315
Nor has the Court ever treated all types of restrictions on speech the
same, its occasional statements to the contrary notwithstanding. 316 Title
VII prohibits sexually harassing speech in the workplace that would
receive First Amendment protection outside of it. 317 Copyright law
continues to both expand and successfully restrict the sale of works that
the First Amendment would almost certainly protect outside the
intellectual property context. 318 Trademark originally only protected
against fraud but it too has expanded, now prohibiting a wide swath of

See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 656 (2000).
Justice Black’s hopes notwithstanding. See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 157 (1959)
(“I read ‘no law abridging’ to mean no law abridging . . . .”).
316 For a discussion of the ways in which the Court has treated different speech differently
see, for example, Geoffrey R. Stone, Free Speech in the Twenty-First Century: Ten Lessons from
the Twentieth Century, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 273, 278 (2009) (finding that the Court has, prior to
now, always “rejected . . . the quest for a unitary standard of review”); see also Steven Shiffrin,
The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from a General Theory of the First
Amendment, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1212, 1251–53 (1983).
317 In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, the Court attempted to explain away this issue by pointing
out that sexual harassment laws only “incidentally” sweep up “sexually derogatory ‘fighting
words’” while prohibiting sexually discriminatory conduct, but for the reasons the plurality
points out this is unconvincing. See 505 U.S. 377, 389, 409–10 (1992) (White, J., concurring);
accord Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Sexual Harassment, Content Neutrality, and the First Amendment
Dog that Didn’t Bark, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 2 (1994) (finding that “First Amendment doctrine
divides into distinctive spheres or categories,” which includes a workplace sphere).
318 Compare Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502
U.S. 105, 123 (1991) (finding that a law that allowed convicted convicts to publish books about
their crime but forbade them from profiting off of those books violates the First Amendment),
with 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106(2) (2012) (granting copyright owners the exclusive right to prepare
derivative works); see also Oren Bracha, The Ideology of Authorship Revisited: Authors, Markets,
and Liberal Values in Early American Copyright, 118 YALE L.J. 186, 230–31 (2008) (discussing
how in the period after the Civil War onward “the scope of copyright protection and the tests
for infringement were expanded well beyond verbatim copying and came to cover increasingly
abstract and remote zones of similarity to the protected work”); Oren Bracha, Commentary on
Stowe v. Thomas (1853), PRIMARY SOURCES OF COPYRIGHT (1450–1900) (2008) (detailing the
dramatic expansion of copyright from its original role as a “publisher’s trade privilege”).
314
315
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expressive uses. 319 Recent scholarship suggests that the post–New Deal
Court simply invented categories of what it deemed low value speech
and then granted Congress the ability to create content-based
regulations of them while avoiding the strict scrutiny that would
normally apply. 320 In short, context matters, and that context has
changed.
The Roberts Court First Amendment has taken a decisively
“deregulatory” turn. 321 And it is this turn, which has been seen most
clearly in the Court’s treatment of commercial speech, which invites a
challenge to the restrictions on an employer’s ability to give financial
support to labor organizations. 322
Sorrell v. IMS epitomizes the shift. 323 There, the Court dramatically
jettisoned intermediate scrutiny of commercial speech and gave
restrictions on its content the same treatment as it did for restrictions on
speech in other areas of public concern. 324 As the Sorrell Court saw it,
“[t]he First Amendment requires heightened scrutiny whenever the
government creates ‘a regulation of speech because of disagreement
with the message it conveys.’ . . . Commercial speech is no exception.” 325
The Court went on to find that the Vermont law restricting the sale of
and use of prescriber-identifying information for marketing purposes
319 See William W. Fisher III, The Growth of Intellectual Property: A History of the
Ownership of Ideas in the United States, in EIGENTUMSKULTUREN IM VERGLEICH 1, 2
(Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht trans., 1999) (“The history of each of these [IP] doctrines (like the
histories of most areas of law) is involuted and idiosyncratic, but one overall trend is common
to all: expansion. With rare exceptions, the set of entitlements created by each of the doctrines
has grown steadily and dramatically from the eighteenth century to present.”)
320 See Genevieve Lakier, The Invention of Low-Value Speech, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2166 (2015).
321 See, e.g., Johanna Kalb & Burt Neuborne, Introduction: Building a First AmendmentFriendly Democracy or a Democracy-Friendly First Amendment, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 10,
12 (2014) (“Over the last decade, the conservative majority on the Roberts Court has invoked
free market metaphor to turn the First Amendment into a deregulatory device.”); Robert Post &
Amanda Shanor, Adam Smith’s First Amendment, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 165, 167 (2015) (“It is
no exaggeration to observe that the First Amendment has become a powerful engine of
constitutional deregulation.”); Tim Wu, The Right to Evade Regulation: How Corporations
Hijacked the First Amendment, NEW REPUBLIC (June 3, 2013), http://www.newrepublic.com/
article/113294/how-corporations-hijacked-first-amendment-evade-regulation
(“Once
the
patron saint of protesters and the disenfranchised, the First Amendment has become the
darling of economic libertarians and corporate lawyers who have recognized its power to
immunize private enterprise from legal restraint.”).
322 See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Roberts Court and Freedom of Speech, 63 FED. COMM. L.J.
579, 581–82 (2011) (“When it comes to freedom of speech, the Roberts Court has been very
much a conservative court. . . . The one place where the Roberts Court has been protective of
speech is with regard to the ability of corporations by implications union [sic] to spend
money.”).
323 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
324 Id.
325 Id. at 2664 (emphases added) (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791
(1989)).
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was a restriction on speech that involved both content and, “in
practice,” viewpoint-based discrimination. 326 As a result, regardless of
whether it was commercial speech, heightened scrutiny applied. 327
As the dissent recognized, the Court’s treatment of a regulation on
the sale and use of certain information constituted a departure from
precedent regarding the treatment of commercial speech. 328 Specifically,
in the context of regulatory programs, the dissent pointed out that
regulations are frequently speaker and content-based. 329 The FDA, for
instance, regulates the activities and speech related to the sale of drugs,
not furniture. 330 And within that domain, the FDA controls what certain
speakers (e.g., pharmaceutical firms) can and cannot say to potential
purchasers (e.g., doctors). For instance, the FDA prohibits
pharmaceutical companies from suggesting that doctors use a drug for
an “off label” purpose, regardless of whether the company thinks that
use a good one for patients. As the dissent saw it, if that was now
unconstitutional, “[The Court] has embarked upon an unprecedented
task—a task that threatens significant judicial interference with widely
accepted regulatory activity.” 331 Six months later the Second Circuit did
just what the dissent found unbelievable when it overturned a
conviction for off-label promotion, holding that the prohibition of offlabel promotion by pharmaceutical manufacturers and their
representatives by the FDA violated the First Amendment. 332
While the Court’s treatment of corporate speech in Sorrell makes a
First Amendment challenge on the bans plausible, regardless of the fact
that the ban exists within a larger regulatory framework, the critical
question is whether giving financial support or other things of value to a
labor organization constitutes speech. As other scholars have pointed

326 Id. (“[This law] imposes a speaker- and content-based burden on protected
expression . . . and, in practice, [is] viewpoint-discriminatory. . . . This Court has held that the
creation and dissemination of information are speech within the meaning of the First
Amendment.”).
327 See id. at 2664 (“[The law] is designed to impose a specific, content-based burden on
protected expression. It follows that heightened judicial scrutiny is warranted. . . . [T]he
‘Government’s content-based burdens must satisfy the same rigorous scrutiny as its contentbased bans.’” (quoting United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 812 (2000))).
328 See id. at 2677 (“Nor has this Court ever previously applied any form of ‘heightened’
scrutiny in any even roughly similar case. . . . [N]either of these categories—‘content-based’ nor
‘speaker-based’—has ever before justified greater scrutiny when regulatory activity affects
commercial speech.”).
329 See id. at 2677–78.
330 See id. at 2677.
331 Id. at 2678.
332 See United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 168–69 (2d Cir. 2012). The FDA did not seek
rehearing en banc, nor did it file a petition for a writ of certiorari. Id.
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out, the threshold question of whether the thing regulated is speech at
all is often, and mistakenly, assumed. 333
There are two ways in which an employer giving money to a labor
organization might constitute speech: either the giving of the money
itself is a form of speech of the money enables speech. We can look at
each in turn. As for whether the provision of money itself is speech, the
Supreme Court’s analysis in Harris v. Quinn provides one avenue for
finding it does. 334 In Harris, the Court held that requiring certain quasipublic sector workers to pay fair share fees violated the First
Amendment. 335 In reaching this conclusion, the Court found that
compelling those workers to give money to the union constituted a form
of compelled speech. 336 The majority said, “[t]he government may not
prohibit the dissemination of ideas that it disfavors, nor compel the
endorsement of ideas that it approves,” and that the compelled funding
of union speech fell into this category. 337 Thus, because that compelled
funding presented the same dangers as compelled speech, it would be
treated as such.
Here we have the opposite: the government prohibits employers
from funding labor organizations. If compelled funding of a labor
organization’s speech can violate the First Amendment, can a
prohibition on funding that labor organization’s speech violate the First
Amendment as well? Or put differently, if money is treated like speech
when funding a union is compelled, will money be treated like speech
when funding a union is prohibited?
As scholars have explained, those who passed section 8(a)(2)
offered two justifications for it. The first concerned employer coercion;
the statute was designed to prohibit companies from creating company
unions, which were frequently used as a means of avoiding outside
unionization efforts. 338 The second, a larger and more theoretical
justification, was that only a worker suffering from a version of false
consciousness would ever choose an employer-supported labor
333 See Genevieve Lakier, The Invention of Low-Value Speech 3–4 (Pub. L. and Legal Theory,
Working Paper No. 488, 2014) (“[S]cholars have devoted little attention to describing, let alone
analyzing, the principles courts actually use to determine what counts as speech for
constitutional purposes.”); see also Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment:
A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1767 (2004)
(“[T]he question whether the First Amendment shows up at all is rarely addressed, and the
answer is too often simply assumed.”).
334 Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014).
335 Id.
336 See id. at 2639 (“[C]ompelled funding of the speech of other private speakers or groups
presents the same dangers as compelled speech.” (quoting Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union,
Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2288 (2012))).
337 Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2288.
338 See Estreicher, supra note 249, at 129–31.
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organization over a fully independent one. As a result, in order to
support employee free choice among rational alternatives (e.g.,
competing independent unions), employer support of unions had to be
prohibited. 339 Both of these justifications are susceptible to the Court’s
criticism of compelled funding in Harris: the government is, in some
sense, “compel[ing] the endorsement of ideas that it approves” by
prohibiting employers and labor organizations from engaging in the
construction of labor organizations that go against the government’s
idea of what a labor organization ought to be. 340 The rationale is also,
like Harris, paternalistic, and runs counter to evidence that the majority
of workers, when asked, would choose a union supported by their
employer over an entirely independent one. 341 While more needs to be
done here, there is a colorable argument that the treatment of compelled
funding in Harris paves the way for the prohibition on funding in
sections 8(a)(2) and 302 to also receive First Amendment scrutiny.
The alternative way the Court finds the giving of money to
constitute speech occurs when that money enables the speech of
another. This method was used in the campaign contribution cases.
Looking back to Buckley, the Court recognized that “virtually every
means” of effectively communicating ideas requires spending money
and restrictions on an individual’s ability to spend money on behalf of a
candidate or to fund one’s own candidacy thus constituted direct
restrictions on the ability of that individual to engage in political
expression. 342 Now, the Court has never said that every time one spends
money, one engages in political expression. 343 It was the fact that money
339 See id. at 131–32; see also Barenberg, supra note 21, at 776. At the time section 8(a)(2)
was passed, it was suggested that an employee “freely” choosing a company-supported union
over a wholly independent one was analogous to a person “freely” choosing slavery. See Labor
Disputes Act: Hearing on H.R. 6288 Before the H. Comm. on Labor, 74th Cong. (1935)
(statement by Sen. Wagner), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS ACT 1935, at 2489 (1949) (“[T]o argue that freedom of organization for the
worker must embrace the right to select a form of organization that is not free is a contradiction
in term. There cannot be freedom in an atmosphere of bondage.”); see also Mark Barenberg,
The Political Economy of the Wagner Act: Power, Symbol, and Workplace Cooperation, 106
HARV. L. REV. 1379, 1460 (1993) (“[W]orkers’ acceptance of company unions had to be due
either to systematic coercion (Wagner’s primary view) or illegitimate distortion of preferences
(the Board’s view) by management.”).
340 Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2639.
341 See RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, WHAT WORKERS WANT 174–80 (1999);
Estreicher, supra note 249, at 128 (finding the false consciousness rationale to “reflect[] an
attitude of paternalism that . . . is no longer appropriate given the level of education and
consciousness of rights that American workers possess today”).
342 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976); see also Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310
(2010).
343 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16 (“Some forms of communication made possible by the giving
and spending of money involve speech alone, some involve conduct primarily, and some
involve a combination of the two.”).
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was given to or spent on behalf of candidates in an election, where that
money, aggregated with other people’s money, allowed for political
expression that made restrictions on that money subject to First
Amendment scrutiny. 344 Thus, we need to know why employers give
money to labor organizations and whether those organizations are
speaking.
The Court has previously answered the second question: labor
organizations speak and speak in a variety of registers, including
political and expressive ones. 345 And indeed, as Justice Frankfurter
observed long ago in dissent, and the Sorrell Court seemed to endorse in
the commercial speech context, “[t]he notion that economic and
political concerns are separable is pre-Victorian. . . . It is not true in life
that political protection is irrelevant to, and insulated from, economic
interests. It is not true for industry or finance. Neither is it true for
labor.” 346 Thus, for purposes of speech analysis, an employer giving
money to a labor organization seems importantly analogous to that
employer giving money to a political campaign.
The campaign finance context may also suggest what sorts of
support and financial contributions from employers sections 8(a)(2)
and 302 can constitutionally prohibit. As the Court has said in the
political context, the government has a compelling interest in
prohibiting quid pro quo corruption and its appearance. 347 While the
current interpretations of both section 8(a)(2) and 302 prohibit a far
broader swath of employer influence on labor organizations than that, a
Court may use a corruption interest to narrow it without fully striking
the bans down. Of course, figuring out what corruption looks like in
both the traditional and nontraditional worker organization context is
344 See id. at 19 (“A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on
political communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by
restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the
audience reached. This is because virtually every means of communicating ideas in today’s
mass society requires the expenditure of money.” (footnote omitted)).
345 See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977); see also Sachs, The Unbundled
Union, supra note 13, at 152 (“At the peak of union strength, more than twenty million
Americans—nearly all within the income classes for whom representational inequality is now a
problem—exercised collective political voice through the union form. Unions have successfully
mobilized their membership to vote, and, by aggregating millions of small-dollar donations
from these members, have built effective lobby operations, led extensive independent electoral
efforts, and positioned themselves as leading campaign contributors.” (footnote omitted)).
346 Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. S.B. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 814–15 (1961) (footnote omitted).
347 See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441 (2014) (“Any regulation [of the political
process] must instead target . . . ‘quid pro quo’ corruption or its appearance. That Latin phrase
captures the notion of a direct exchange of an official act for money. ‘The hallmark of
corruption is the financial quid pro quo: dollars for political favors.’” (citation omitted)
(quoting McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 266 (1991))); see also Citizens United, 558
U.S. 310.
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far from clear. Unions and employers that engage in pre-organizing
MOAs with employers must not believe that all cooperation between
employers and labor organizations is a form of corruption. And, indeed,
the Court’s analysis in Sorrell seems to support this position. As
discussed, there Vermont wanted to limit the relationship between
doctors and pharmaceutical company marketers in order to, among
other things, ensure the doctors were making decisions on behalf of
patients without commercial interference. Here, the restrictions on
company support are similarly designed to preserve a particular type of
relationship between labor organizations and workers. But, at least
under the Court’s reasoning in Sorrell, it does not appear this Court
finds third-party influence on such important relationships a form of
corruption. 348
Determining what corruption of non-traditional worker
organizations looks like, though, requires more thought. Such
organizations often help workers but do so without forming any sort of
contractual relationship with them. And yet these organizations, which
have the potential to dramatically help workers, may take hundreds of
thousands of dollars a year from employers, as is the case with the
Accord after the Rana Plaza tragedy. 349 Without those large
contributions, such organization may not have the resources necessary
to provide the on-the-ground monitoring and training likely necessary
to be effective. Similarly complicated is the question of whether a
corruption analysis should change when employers are also members of
the organization they are financing, as is the case with the Restaurant
Opportunities Centers United and the Googler’s LGBT affiliation group.
CONCLUSION
A variety of economic, doctrinal, and consumer shifts have
together motivated the development of new and heterogeneous forms of
worker organization. 350 While these shifts have made certain types of
bargaining with employers impracticable for a large share of Americans,
348 See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2671 (2011) (“That the State finds
expression too persuasive does not permit it to quiet the speech or to burden its messenger.”);
see also 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 487, 518 (1996) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (striking down a ban on price advertising on alcohol that was justified on the
grounds that such ads might persuade people to do something bad (drink more), the majority
said, “in cases such as this, in which the government’s asserted interest is to keep legal users of a
product or service ignorant in order to manipulate their choices in the marketplace . . . such an
‘interest’ is per se illegitimate and can no more justify regulation of ‘commercial’ speech than it
can justify regulation of ‘noncommercial’ speech”).
349 See discussion supra Section II.A.2.
350 See discussion supra Part I.
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they have also made working with and receiving funding from
reputation-conscious employers a different, and potentially powerful,
tool for the improvement of work. 351 In its current formulation, the
definition of “labor organization” and the broad reach of sections
8(a)(2) of the NLRA and 302 of the LMRA cast a shadow of uncertainty
over the legality of many of these organizations. 352
While there are colorable constitutional arguments against the
current scope of sections 8(a)(2) and 302, 353 the question remains
whether the various types of privately negotiated agreements between
these nontraditional worker organizations and companies are
normatively desirable. Answering this question requires one to answer
hard questions about, among other things, what the goals of labor
organizing should be—both today and looking forward to a world of
evolving worker-employer relations; what companies owe or ought to
provide to workers; what and whose goods we are interested in
increasing; whether and to what extent intervention by our government
at this point in time is likely to help or hinder the achievement of those
ends, and whether that government intervention is legitimate, regardless
of its potential effects.
These are difficult questions. If one thinks, as those at the time
section 8(a)(2) was passed did, that there is a fundamental antagonism
between workers and employers, one might be skeptical of the
possibility that relationships between workers and employers that rely
on anything other than enforceable contracts will help workers achieve
long-term gains. 354 For those committed to workplace democracy as well
as democratic structures within labor organizations, the desirability of
privately negotiated agreements between nontraditional worker
organizations and companies may be unclear. While the Immokalee
Worker’s Fair Food Council is not chosen by the workers who benefit
from its actions via a democratic process, and the organization itself
makes no commitments to internal democracy, it has been able to
demand the creation of health and safety councils for workers. 355 And,
once in place, those councils give workers the opportunity to exercise
voice in workplaces where they otherwise likely could not. Time
See discussion supra Part II.
See discussion supra Part III.
353 See discussion supra Section IV.B.
354 This also echoes the concerns labor had in response to the rise of welfare capitalism and
company unionism in the 1920s. See, e.g., DUBOFSKY & DULLES, supra note 67, at 209–38;
WILLIAM GREEN, THE SUPERIORITY OF TRADE UNIONS OVER COMPANY “UNIONS” 7 (1926) (“In
exercising control over company unions employers accomplish a double purpose. They satisfy
the instinct of the workers to organize and they completely dominate and control the company
union with which the workers are identified.”).
355 See discussion supra Section II.A.2.
351
352
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horizons are also a question. While one may think the arrangements
discussed in this paper are good because they better conditions for some
of those worst off workers today, what if in the long-term such
arrangements result in fewer benefits than a world in which sections
8(a)(2) and 302 do more to prohibit them?
This paper takes the position that privately negotiated agreements
between various nontraditional worker organizations and companies
can be good because they are, today, resulting in improved conditions
for workers. In future work I will look more closely at whether that
position is normatively sustainable, and if so, on what basis. For now, it
is important to simply recognize that these arrangements are occurring,
they are heterogeneous, and there are reasons to believe labor law will
come to regulate them moving forward. And, in the face of changing
working conditions, there is at least prima facie evidence that these
relationships have helped improve conditions for workers—from
tomato pickers in Florida to the lesbian software engineers in California.
As a result, it is time to once again rethink these bans. There are a
variety of ways this rethinking could go and this Article introduces a
few.

